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Abstract 
This thesis aims to study why some Member States are more efficient in mediating the 
negotiations during the Presidency of the Council of the European Union than others. To 
fill the gap in current academic research, the emphasis is put on how the model of 
coordination between the presiding country’s capital and Permanent Representation in 
Brussels affects the performance of the Presidency. Rational choice institutionalism 
provides the opportunity to conceptualise efficiency of the Presidency as the advancement 
of the negotiations on a priority initiative, rather than protection of national preferences 
as defined conventionally. The principal-agent model offers the necessary analytical tools 
to examine different models of coordination for European Union policies. This theoretical 
approach provides also the adequate analytical tools to study the link between model of 
coordination and efficiency of the Presidency, leading to the hypothesis that Brussels-
based Presidencies are more efficient in leading the negotiations on a priority initiative 
than the Presidencies that have adopted capital-based models.  
In the empirical part of the study qualitative comparative method is used to compare the 
performance of Italian and Latvian Presidencies in advancing the negotiations on 
Telecom Single Market proposal. The analysis of written documents and input from 
interviews indicate quite clearly that Latvian Presidency was much more efficient in its 
role as the mediator of the negotiations on this dossier. The findings also demonstrate that 
there is significant variation in the adopted model of coordination. Whereas Italy opted 
for a capital-based Presidency, Latvian Presidency was Brussels-based. To large extent 
the assumptions presented in the theoretical part of the thesis were confirmed. The 
Latvian Brussels-based Presidency was able to make decisions much faster and on spot, 
whereas Italian Permanent Representation had to endure extensive interventions from the 
capital, which made the progress slower. The findings also indicate that Latvian 
Presidency was able to act as an “honest broker” and go beyond its national preferences 
in order to reach a compromise. Additionally, it was confirmed that Brussels-based model 
enables better cooperation with other actors due to higher level of trust. However, the 
premise that the Brussels-based Presidency is more efficient due to better cooperation 
with the Council Secretariat was not proven. All in all the findings of the study show that 
the main hypothesis is correct and Brussels-based Presidencies are more efficient in 
advancing the negotiations on priority initiative.   
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Introduction  
The aim of this thesis is to study why some of the Member States are more efficient in 
their role as the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union. In doing so, 
this study focuses on how the model of coordination between the presiding country’s 
capital and Permanent Representation in Brussels affects the performance of the 
Presidency. Building on rational choice institutionalism,  the thesis provides a theoretical 
framework for not only examining the different forms of EU policy coordination models 
in different Member States, but also basis for conceptualising the efficiency of the 
Presidency as its success in advancing the negotiations on its priority. This study will 
essentially focus on the link between how much power Member States delegate to their 
Brussels representations and how this affects their efficiency in the role of mediating 
negotiations during the Presidency.   
A number of previous studies have examined how different Member States coordinate 
their European Union policies. As stated by Panke, the differences between Member 
States are not that clear on formal level, because often the rules of procedure that 
determine the balance of power between the capital and Permanent Representation are 
quite similar from Member State to Member State. But there are substantial differences 
on informal level- on how the Member States in concrete policy fields coordinate their 
positions.1 The research so far has focused largely on how the European Union policies 
are coordinated and how the process of preparing the instructions for presenting Member 
State’s position in the Council of the European Union looks like. I would argue that 
Permanent Representation to the European Union as an institution, which plays such a 
vital role in the overall European Union decision-making process, is to some extent 
understudied. Essentially the models of coordination during the Presidency can be divided 
into two extremes: the Brussels-based and capital based systems. Focusing on examining 
the overall coordination between national capital and national representatives in Brussels 
during the Presidency is necessary and contributes to filling the gap in research.   
The second focus of this thesis is to analyse how efficiency of the Presidency has been 
and how it could be further studied. Numerous research papers have been conducted on 
                                                
1 Panke, Diana (2010) “Good Instructions in No Time? Domestic Coordination of EU Policies in 19 
Small States” West European Politics, vol 33 (4), p 773. 
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how to measure the efficiency of the Presidency. Nevertheless there is a lack of clarity on 
several issues. For example there is no consensus among researchers even on how to 
conceptualise efficiency-what constitutes an efficient or successful Presidency. 
Conventionally researchers have used the term influence of the Presidency instead and 
conceptualised it as success in advancing the policies that are national priorities. In this 
paper I will define the success of the Presidency as its ability to advance legislative files 
that the Presidency itself has indicated to be priority. 
Even more complicated is determining the factors that influence the efficiency as there 
are so many of them and their effect is difficult to test empirically. In this thesis I will 
give an overview about different perspectives, but the main aim of this paper is to study 
the link between one factor- the level of delegation- and efficiency. The objective is not 
to draw any final conclusions on the causality between the two variables or on which 
factors are relevant for ensuring a successful Presidency, rather to examine in greater 
detail the possible link between those two variables. Essentially, the aim is to find out 
whether and to what extent can the chosen model of coordination affect the performance 
of the Presidency. This link between level of delegation and efficiency of the Presidency 
has been to large extent ignored in in-depth research so far. Authors like Chelotti have 
focused on the so called micro-foundations of the formulation of European Union 
policies- on how the national positions are formed. 2 But there is a clear lack of this kind 
of approach during Presidency. Bunse and Vandecasteele have put some emphasis on the 
level of delegation as a variable affecting the performance of the Presidency, but the 
analyses have been rather vague and superficial.3 Building on the rational choice 
institutionalism framework the assumption is that it is crucial do acknowledge the 
difference in Member States conduct when holding the Presidency. The distinction 
between how the formation of national positions looks like during the period the Member 
State is not holding the Presidency and when the Member State is the rotating Presidency 
is crucial. The norm of “honest broker” or in other words neutrality imperative comes 
                                                
2 Chelotti, Nicola (2013) “Analysing the Links between National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign 
Policy” West European Politics, vol 36 (5), p 1054.  
3 Bunse, Simone (2009) Small States and EU Governance- Leadership through the Council Presidency, 
Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, p 8. 
Vandecasteele, Bruno; Bossuyt, Fabienne; Orbie, Jan (2015) “A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis of the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies and European Union Eastern Partnership 
Policies” European Politics and Society, p 4.  
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into play, which changes the whole nature of the coordination of policies between the 
capital and Brussels representation. This fits very well into the overall approach of the 
rational choice institutionalism that allows to claim that the aim of the Presidency is 
indeed achieving this kind of efficiency as defined in this paper.  
In the empirical part of the study two cases will be analysed and compared to draw 
conclusions about the relevance of the link between the delegation variable and the 
efficiency variable. The negotiation process of the Telecom Single Market proposal will 
be traced under the Italian and Latvian Presidency. Although both of the Member States 
presented this dossier as a priority only the latter made significant progress in the 
negotiations. This case provides an excellent opportunity to conduct a comparative 
analysis to indicate whether the main hypothesis offered in this thesis has explanatory 
power. The findings and analysis indicate that the efficiency of the Latvian Presidency in 
advancing the negotiations on Telecom Single Market proposal can to large extent be 
ascribed to the chosen Brussels-based model, whereas the Italian Presidency’s more 
modest performance was also affected by the disadvantages of the chosen capital-based 
coordination model. 
This thesis consists of two main parts. In the first chapter the theoretical framework in 
presented and examined. Although there are several theoretical frameworks that could be 
used to analyse the efficiency of the Presidency, the rational choice institutionalism, 
which in part of the larger new-institutionalism framework, but also encompasses 
principal-agent approach, provides the best analytical tools to analyse the link between 
the two variables- level of delegation and efficiency. However this does not of course 
mean that all other theoretical approaches are completely ignored in this thesis. So in the 
first chapter the theoretical foundation of principal-agent framework is presented, 
followed by conceptualisation and discussion on the efficiency of the Presidency. 
Subsequently an overview on how the role of Presidency has developed into its current 
institutional form is given. This is salient for understanding all the duties that the 
Presidency has in the overall complicated decision-making process of the European 
Union. This will also offer a better basis for apprehending the different factors that have 
been used to explain the efficiency of the Presidency in different theoretical frameworks. 
Subsequently the literature review on how different authors using different theoretical 
frameworks, if any, have tried to explain the factors behind successful Presidency is 
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presented. I will also give an overview about research on the domestic coordination of 
EU polices, the role of Permanent Representations in Brussels and policy coordination 
between capital and Brussels representatives so far. All this will help put the main 
hypothesis of this thesis into larger picture.  
In the second chapter the empirical study of Italian and Latvian Presidencies is presented. 
Firstly, the research methodology is introduced. In the empirical part of the study two 
main sources of information are described- examination of written documents and 
interviews. Interviews are conducted with the persons, who were directly involved in the 
Telecom Single Market negotiations during Italian and Latvian Presidencies to get 
additional insights. This is followed by a discussion on the operationalisation of both 
variables to be tested in this paper- the level of delegation and efficiency of the 
Presidency. Subsequently the formation of the empirical study is described and examined. 
Then the findings of the empirical study are presented. The main results from both the 
written document examination and interviews on the main independent and dependent 
variable are described. This is followed by the presentation of findings on the relevance 
of the link between these two variables, describing to what extent the findings support the 
main hypothesis on this paper-  the more Brussels-based the model of coordination, the 
higher the efficiency of the Presidency. Subsequently I will discuss the results in the 
perspective of the theoretical framework presented in the second chapter and elaborate 
about the accuracy and relevance of the main hypothesis. This is accompanied by the 
discussion on the effect of other conditions for efficiency that are presented in the 
theoretical framework.  
  
9 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
1.1 Rational choice institutionalism  
Before examining both the conditions for efficient Presidency and how the overall EU 
policy coordination is functioning in different Member States, the theoretical foundations 
of explaining the link between the two variables- level of delegation and Presidency’s 
performance, need to be presented. The rational choice institutionalism, more precisely 
principal agent approach, offers the adequate theoretical tools to demonstrate this link. 
As argued by Bunse the most crucial merit of the new institutionalism is that it seeks to 
determine how and under which conditions institutions are successful in pursuing their 
goals, which involves examination of the resource/constraint structure within which the 
Presidency operates as well as the skill of the office holder to exploit the opportunities 
which present themselves with the chair position.4 But rational choice institutionalism 
offers the opportunity to combine this element with the delegation variable, the central 
element of principal-agent approach. And as such the rational choice institutionalism 
provides a good theoretical framework to imply descriptive and causal hypothesis of the 
link between the two, which is the main objective of theory as stated by King, Keohane 
and Verba in their seminal book on research design.5 In this section an overview about 
the new-institutionalism, under which also the rational choice institutionalism belongs, is 
given. This followed by elaboration on the principal-agent model and how this exactly 
helps to explain the linkage between the two variables.  
Although initially rational choice institutionalism began with the effort by American 
political scientists to understand the origins and effects of US Congressional institutions 
on legislative behaviour and policy outcomes, rational choice institutionalism insights 
“travelled” to other domestic and international contexts and were quickly taken up in EU 
studies as well. These authors argued that purely intergovernmental models of EU 
decision-making underestimated the causal importance of EU rules in shaping policy 
outcomes.6 Thus the new institutionalism attributes a crucial role to institutions in 
                                                
4 Bunse 2009: 8. 
5 King, Gary; Keohane, Robert O.; Verba, Sidney (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference 
in Qualitative Research, Princeton University Press: Princeton, p 19.  
6 Pollack, Mark „Theorizing EU Policy-Making“ in: Wallace, Helen; Pollack, Mark; Young, Alasdair 
(2010) Policy-Making in the European Union, New York: Oxford University Press, p 21-22. 
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explaining political behaviour and outcomes- the central assumption being that 
institutions make a difference.7 Or in other words, rational choice institutionalism 
combines the individualistic cornerstone found in rational choice and the acceptance of 
institutions as important entities in explaining politics and the behaviour of political 
individuals, which translates into a theoretical school which puts an emphasis on how 
institutions can help rational, utility-maximising actors to actually reach optimal results.8 
New institutionalist definition of institutions is useful here because it is not only based on 
formal rules, but also on informal procedures- so far hardly touched upon in the 
Presidency literature. So in addition to the formal, structural aspects of institutions, it 
focuses on actual behaviour.9 And like Panke has stated, than the latter has been 
understudied so far.10 
New institutionalism tries to combine the main elements of both major European Union 
integration schools. From new functionalism it accepts that institutions “take a life on 
their own” influencing policy choices in ways that cannot be predicted from the 
preference and power of the Member State alone.11 Thus in a way institutions also 
increase the predictability of the involved actors.12 From intergovermentalism the new 
institutionalists borrow insights about the centrality of national governments and their 
preferences in the European Union’s development.13 Hence, in principle the Member 
States have their national interests and exogenous preferences, but institutions may affect 
the behaviour of these Member States. Contrary to other versions of rational choice 
theory, rational choice institutionalism accepts that the sources and definitions of personal 
interests may not all be exogenous as individuals and institutions also interact to create 
preferences and to be successful they have to accommodate certain norms and 
institutional values.14 And the Member State holding the Presidency, which has its own 
set preferences, has several norms during its time at the office that it has to accommodate- 
                                                
7 Bunse 2009: 6.  
8 Larue, Thomas (2006) Agents in Brussels. Delegation and Democracy in the European Union, Ph. D. 
dissertation, Department of Political Science, Umeå University, p 36.  
9 Bunse 2009: 7. 
10 Panke 2010: 773. 
11 Bunse 2009: 7. 
12 Galuškova, Johana; Kaniok, Petr (2015) „I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation 
of the Czech Republic to the European Union“ Politics in Central Europe, vol 11(2), p 26.  
13 Bunse 2009: 8. 
14 Ibid: 7. 
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like the norm of honest broker.15 Institutions like the norm of neutrality thus not only 
shape the actors strategies, but also their goals. And looking through the lenses of rational 
choice institutionalism, it is possible to claim that the goal of the Presidency is to be 
perceived efficient in its role. So it is also possible to argue that the conceptualisation of 
Presidency’s efficiency used in this thesis captures the essence more adequately than just 
describing the efficiency as advancement of national preferences.  
Next, I shall give an overview about one of the key concept of rational choice 
institutionalism- principal-agent approach- which sets the theoretical framework to study 
the coordination models and explain the link between successful delegation and efficient 
Presidency. Central to rational choice institutionalism is the concept of principal-agent 
(PA). PA is a model, initially borrowed from the new economics of organisation, that 
assumes that the principal enters into a contractual relation with a second party, the agent, 
and delegates responsibility to the latter to fulfil certain responsibilities or a set of tasks 
on behalf of the principal. The key concept of PA is thus delegation, which is realised 
when one person (or group of individuals) selects another person (or group) to act on their 
behalf.16 In the classic representation, the principal is the shareholder of a company that 
contracts an executive to manage the business on day-to-day basis, but in general the 
principal can be any individual or organisation that delegates responsibility to another in 
order to economise on transaction costs, pursue goals that would otherwise be too costly, 
or secure expertise.17 
But before elaborating on the possible difficulties that may arise in a principal-agent 
relationship, the incentives behind delegating should be further examined. As noted above 
the main rationale is the desire to minimise transaction costs for which delegation 
provides the following means. First and foremost, delegation improves the quality of 
policy-making in technical areas by delegating responsibilities to an agent with specialist 
knowledge. Secondly, it has been argued that delegation has been used to displace 
responsibility for unpopular decisions. Difficulties arise on account of the asymmetric 
distribution of information that favours the agent, including the adverse selection and 
                                                
15 Tallberg, Jonas (2004) „The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU 
Negotiations“ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 42(5), p 1006.  
16 Larue 2006: 29. 
17 Kassim, Hussein; Menon, Anand (2003) „The principal-agent approach and the study of the European 
Union: promise unfulfilled?“ Journal of European Public Policy, vol 10(1), p 122. 
12 
 
moral hazard.18 The asymmetry of information can allow the agent to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour – shirking - that is costly to the principal, but difficult to detect. 
The likelihood of shirking is increased by slippage, when the very structure of delegation 
“provides incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the 
principal”. Hence, assuring control and limiting shirking is the principal’s problem.19 
Three main ways of avoiding shirking has been identified in the literature:  
- Providing incentives for the agent to avoid opportunistic behaviour; 
- Contractual restriction; 
- Monitoring. 20 
Larue has offered additional variables to be considered in minimising the possible 
negative effects of delegation, naming 6 possible factors- contract design, screening and 
selection mechanisms, reporting and monitoring requirements, institutional checks, 
domestic coordination, preference formation.21 The same variables will be used in this 
thesis to examine the level of delegation between the capitals and Permanent 
Representations, but most emphasis will be put on the monitoring and reporting factor, 
which encompasses most extensively the level of accountability that Permanent 
Representations have to ensure and which may be time and resource consuming, thus 
hampering Presidency’s capability to perform in its duties. Other variables, i.e. contract 
design, will not be given so much attention, but nevertheless it will still be involved in 
the overall assessment of the level of delegation between the capital and Permanent 
Representation, when adequate and necessary. As argued by Panke, informal functioning 
has gained much less attention and thus should be scrutinised more extensively.22 And 
examining the monitoring and reporting practices of different Presidencies will give a 
better overview about this.  
Monitoring is one of the most salient instruments to tackle the central element of 
principal-agent problem- the information asymmetry. Lupia has distinguished three ways 
                                                
18 Larure 2006: 46.  
19 Pollack, Mark (1997) “Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community” 
International Organization, vol 51(1), p 108. 
20 Kassim; Menon 2003: 122.  
21 Larue 2006: 47. 
22 Panke 2010: 773. 
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in which the principal can exercise monitoring in order to minimise the informational 
asymmetry and thus assuring control and limiting shirking: 
- Direct monitoring; 
- Attending to the what the agent says about his activities; 
- Attending to third party testimony about agents actions.23 
Direct monitoring has the advantage of supplying the principal with direct information, 
but it is very rarely practiced, mostly due to its high cost for the principal. Although the 
other two options are less costly, the most evident problem with them is the risk for 
principal of being misled by erroneous information.24 But all of these monitoring options 
also have effect on the performance of the agent. The monitoring process may be 
cumbersome for the agent and thus hamper the quality of its performance. At issue, in 
other words, is the effectiveness of delegation: the choice is either minimize the risk of 
agency loss or allow the agent the independence to carry out its responsibilities 
efficiently.25 
Thus the PA approach provides adequate tools to explain how the level of delegation 
affects the performance of the Presidency. The main emphasis will be put on examining 
the communication between the capital (principal) and Permanent Representations 
(agent). This includes both providing strict instructions as a mandate for negotiations 
from the capital as well as monitoring the daily functioning of the Permanent 
Representations. Scrutinising these elements will give the necessary level of 
understanding how cumbersome the principal-agent relationship is for the agent, but also 
if and how the different levels of involvement from the capital or Permanent 
Representation’s independence influence the success of the Presidency. Hence, rational 
choice institutionalism provides a necessary level of flexibility to involve various aspects, 
e.g. involvement of informal rules and procedures, into the analysis. Principal-agent 
framework will give sufficient analytical tools to assess the level of delegation and thus 
                                                
23 Lupia, Arthur (2003) "Delegation and its Perils." In Strøm, Kaare; Müller, Wolfgang; Bergman, 
Torbjörn Delegation and Accountability in West European Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p 49.  
24 Larue 2006: 50.  
25 Kassim, Menon 2003: 125.  
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also the link between which model of delegation is adopted by the Presidency and its 
efficiency.  
1.2 Presidency of the Council- setting the scene 
Most of the academic accounts on the EU Council Presidency are either theoretically 
descriptive or case studies of individual Presidencies, but the general discourse on EU 
Council Presidency is, nevertheless, extensive. In theoretical discussion the prevailing 
debate is between rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches. Whereas 
rationalist approaches, like already argued above, see the Member States as rational actors 
trying to maximise their influence in negotiations and the Presidency is an additional 
power resource, the sociological approaches assume that negotiators behave according to 
norms and role concepts, which they believe to be appropriate.26 In a way, this thesis tries 
to build a bridge between those two approaches. But in order to understand the academic 
discussion on Presidency’s efficiency better, the institutional setting and values have to 
be examined.  
As the ambition of this study is essentially to analyse the policy making process of the 
European Union, but concentrating only on one part of it- the role of Presidency- it is 
nevertheless reasonable to examine the larger picture of actors in the whole policy making 
process. There are seven official institutions of the European Union according to the 
treaties and European Commission and European Parliament have a prominent role in 
this process and thus the Presidency, which is representing the interest of the Council of 
the European Union, has to take them into account in order to achieve efficiency during 
its term.27 The six-month rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union is an 
integral part of the European Union’s institutional system since the very beginning, 
although of course the context and role has altered significantly. When in earlier phase of 
European integration the role of the Council’s Presidency was mainly symbolic and 
administrative, the main task being the chairing of meetings, then gradually this 
institution has gained new functionalities, including in the interinstitutional sphere.28 In 
                                                
26 Vandecasteele, Bruno; Bossuyt, Fabienne (2014) “Assessing EU council presidencies: (conditions for) 
success and influence” Comparative European Politics, vol 12(2), p 235.  
27 Bunse 2009: 60. 
28 Kaniok, Petr; Šteigrova, Leona (2014) “Presidency and State Administration in the Czech Republic: 
Planting a Seed or a Shattered Chance?” Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol 10(3), p 339. 
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fact, the basic structure of the Presidency from the 1950s has not changed substantially, 
only the repertoire of tasks has increased significantly over time.29 Nevertheless this 
transformation has been informal as the formal treaties up until Lisbon Treaty were quite 
modest on the exact role of the Presidency.30 The Presidency institution increased its 
visibility and importance informally, gradually becoming the mediator body also in the 
interinstitutional affairs.31 But trying to analyse the role of the Council of the European 
Union, which the Presidency represents inter alia in interinstitutional matter that 
eventually will lead to political decisions that determine the efficiency, is not an easy task. 
Most of the work is still done behind the closed doors making the Council of the EU least 
accessible part of the EU decision-making process.32 Already identifying the actors in the 
Council, which is multi-layered, is complicated as not only the ministers and their 
positions are relevant, but also national officials representing Member States on lower 
level have to be taken into consideration. This is mainly so, because of the fact that most 
decisions are reached or- or at least “pre-cooked”- at the lower levels of decision 
making.33 Thus it is clear that when analysing the Council it is also necessary, due to its 
unique institutional setting, to take the lower levels more into account. And that is exactly 
what this study will do.  
An important aspect in examining the role of the Presidency is also analysing the norms 
that the Presidency is expected to follow. In the context of this thesis it is especially 
relevant as this is connected on how the term efficiency is conceptualised. The 
“Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union” published by the 
General Secretariat of the Council states that Presidency is by definition neutral and 
impartial, and is the moderator for discussions and cannot therefore favour either its own 
preferences or those of a particular Member State.34 Some researchers see a dichotomy 
between neutrality and efficiency, because they treat efficiency or success of the 
                                                
29 Cunha, Alice; Magone, Jose (2015) “The changing role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the 
European Union: Setting the context for the study of the Iberian cases” International Journal of Iberian 
Studies, vol 28(2), p 139. 
30 Kaniok et al 2014: 339.  
31 Cunha, Magone 2015: 140.  
32 Bunse 2009: 263. 
33 Versluis, Esther; Mendeltje, Van Keulen; Stephenson, Paul (2011) Analyzing the European Union 
Policy Process, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, p 37. 
34 “Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union” (2015) Council of the European 
Union, p 12. 
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Presidency as pushing the national agenda of the Member State holding the Presidency. 
But as elaborated more closely in the next sections then following the neutrality can 
indeed lead to more efficient Presidency. In sum, it is the Presidency that shapes and 
manages the decision-making process between the institutions. The Presidency is a 
strategic agent, which is at the same time constrained by the rules of the “game”.35 The 
underlying argument of this thesis is that adhering to the rules of the game will ensure the 
efficiency of the Presidency. In the following section I will elaborate more on the 
conceptualisation of the dependent variable- efficiency- and give an overview about 
which kind of conditions for efficiency are proposed and studied in the academic literature 
so far.  
1.3 Efficiency of the Presidency  
1.3.1 Conceptualisation of efficiency 
Studying the Presidency has become part of the mainstream research of the EU political 
system and the main focus, apart from the descriptive case-studies, has been on analysing 
and measuring the performance of the Presidency during its term. But the debate on 
whether the Presidency exerts additional influence on EU decision-making or not is still 
ongoing. While some researchers claim that holding the Presidency is of limited or no 
relevance for the influence of a Member State in the EU, the others have shown that 
Member States holding the Presidency do exert additional influence on decision-
making.36 But there is still no clarity on how to exactly conceptualise efficiency. 
Vandecasteele and Bossuyt have attempted to distinguish between success and influence 
of the Presidency. They conceptualised “influence” as the extent to which the Presidency 
made a difference in decision making and “success” as how the Presidency behaved 
and/or how much of its goals were reached.37 The conventional approach is to define 
efficiency through the perspective of Presidency advancing its own national preferences 
as much as possible. This is more or less tied to the term influence as described by 
                                                
35 Cunha, Magone 2015: 139. 
36 Vandecasteele, Bruno; Bossuyt, Fabienne; Orbie, Jan (2013) „Unpacking the influence of the Council 
Presidency on European Union external policies: The Polish Council Presidency and the Eastern 
Partnership“ in: Servent Ripoll; Busby, Ariadna; Busby, Amy “Agency and influence inside the EU 
institutions” European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, Vol. 17 (5), p 1.  
37 Vandecasteele; Bossuyt, 2014: 243.   
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Vandecasteele and Bossuyt. Less research has be devoted on studying the success of the 
Presidency. 
One way of looking at the same issue would be creating a continuum of efficiency during 
the Presidency, on which on the one end are the “silencers” and on the other end 
“amplifiers”, as Bengtsson et al. have put it.38 The “silencers” are conceptualised as those 
Presidencies, which ignore their own national interest during the period chairing the 
Council, the amplifiers are advancing their own policies as much as possible. And for the 
amplifiers the Presidency offers a good possibility for example through agenda setting to 
put emphasis on issues that are relevant to them. The rationales of the other side of this 
dichotomy, the “silencers”, is so far mostly explained with the arguments from the 
sociological institutionalism and logic of appropriateness. The norm of neutrality is 
playing a crucial role in affecting the conduct of the Presidency. The core of literature on 
the efficiency of Presidency has used to large extent the same conceptualisation of 
efficiency like the term “amplifiers” described here. But linking efficiency directly with 
how much the Member State holding the Presidency can advance its own national agenda 
is problematic in many ways. As already noted above, the Presidency is expected to 
accommodate the norm of neutrality of honest broker. It could be argued that this very 
visible non-compliance with this norm of neutrality will affect the overall reputation of 
the Presidency and thus also how successful the Presidency is perceived to be in its role. 
But this will also influence the behaviour and complaisance of other Member States in 
the Council during the negotiations.  
Thus the underlying reasoning in this thesis is that efficiency is defined as success of 
Presidency in ensuring progress on negotiations of the priorities it has set for itself in 
consultation with other EU institutions. The definition provided by Smeets and Vennix is 
adopted, who have conceptualised success of the Presidency as: “the amount of progress 
a Presidency manages to achieve in those issue area(s) on which it chooses to focus its 
attention”.39 
                                                
38 Bengtsson, Rikard; Elgström, Ole; Tallberg, Jonas (2004) „Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union 
Presidency and the Nordic Countries“ Scandinavian Political Studies, vol 27 (3), pp 311-312.  
39 Smeets, Sandrino; Vennix, Jac (2014) „How to make the most of your time in the Chair: EU 
presidencies and the management of Council debates“ Journal of European Public Policy, vol 21(10), p 
1437.  
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1.3.2 Conditions for efficiency 
As the literature on Presidency’s efficiency is quite rich and nuanced then for the sake of 
clarity it is reasonable to divide the factors into categories, similarly to how Vilpišauskas 
et al. have divided the conditions for Presidency influence into three categories.40 This 
kind of approach provides a good basis for analysing the effect of different conditions for 
the whole Presidency. However as the focus of this thesis is to examine in greater detail 
one of the conditions- level of delegation- in one specific policy field and to compare two 
cases, it is better to divide the conditions into following categories:   
- The preconditions/control variables (which have to be similar for valid 
comparison);  
- Level of delegation (the main independent variable);  
- Background variables (both issue-specific and country-specific).  
The following section is structured according to this categorisation. First an overview 
about the preconditions will be given. The preconditions have to be similar for both 
researched cases, otherwise the comparison would not be very valid. Two main elements 
can be considered to be preconditions for conducting comparison. First, the external 
context, including the legislative phase the Presidency takes place, has to be similar. 
Secondly, both the Presidencies have to have indicated this particular dossier or initiative 
a priority. If the cases meet these conditions, then a valid comparison can be conducted. 
The elaboration on the theoretical relevance of preconditions is followed by the 
examination of the main independent variable- level of delegation. The main benefits of 
both capital-based and Brussels-based Presidencies will be listed. Subsequently other 
background variables, which have been discussed in the academic literature, will be 
presented. The latter will not be examined in great detail in the empirical part of this 
thesis, but they are used to put the main independent variable into the larger picture.  
The preconditions  
No matter how well prepared the Member State is for the Presidency it is difficult to 
foresee possible external crises that could bring a lot of confusion and difficulties in 
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focusing on priority issues. However, the external context may also provide additional 
opportunities to make considerable advancements in initiatives that would otherwise have 
been ignored. One obvious example is how the energy crisis in Ukraine made possible to 
develop the European Union’s security of supply proposals in a much faster pace than it 
would have been possible otherwise. The external crises do not necessarily constitute an 
unfavourable external environment if the issue is well-handed and it will provide 
opportunities for leadership, thus allowing the Presidency to steer EU policies.41 This 
capability to use the crises to show leadership can of course be perceived as efficiency of 
the Presidency. Nonetheless, rapid external changes are often inevitable, but rather seen 
as obstacles than opportunities from the perspective of the Presidency.  
Additional external context related factor, which has been analysed to some extent in 
connection with Presidency’s efficiency is the overall economic situation in the European 
Union and its key Member States. Bunse has argued that in periods of prosperity the 
Member States may be more inclined to make costly compromises than in periods of 
economic hardship.42 Thus during periods of economic difficulties the Presidency may 
have certain additional limits on reaching a compromise. 
A salient variable, which is confirmed by various studies, is also the stage of European 
Union legislative process the Presidency takes place in. The efficiency of the Presidency 
is dependent on how many initiatives are on the table. It has been claimed that nearly 95% 
of Presidency’s agenda is inherited. The legislative cycle of the European Union is 
determined by the European Parliament elections taking place every five years, which 
inter alia determines the head of the European Commission. European Commission is the 
only institution that has the right to propose legislation. As the term in office for the 
European Commission President and its team is five years, the first year is normally 
devoted to setting the agenda and developing the proposals. In the initial stages of the 
legislative processes, the examination of files is usually explanatory (by the 
Commission), exploratory (by the Member States) and generally preparatory for the next 
and crucial stages.43 In the second half of its term the Commission usually releases its 
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priority proposals and asserts pressure on other institutions- the Council and the 
Parliament- to proceed with the negotiations as quickly as possible. Thus, the Member 
States, which Presidency is in the second half of the legislative cycle tend to have more 
on their table and also backing from other EU institutions, most notably from the 
Commission, to advance the negotiations. Therefore the efficiency of the Presidency is 
dependent on the timing of the Presidency as argued by many authors.  
Therefore two type of preconditions are ascertained- the external context and salience for 
the Presidency. Only if these are similar, it is possible to compare the performance of the 
Presidencies on a specific negotiation. In the next section the theoretical foundations of 
why the main independent variable should affect the efficiency of the Presidency is 
introduced.  
1.4 Model of coordination between capital and Permanent 
Representation 
In analysing the level of delegation between the two actors- national ministries in the 
capitals (principals) and Permanent Representations in Brussels (agents)- the 
coordination process between the two should be scrutinised. For that we first have to take 
a look on what the literature has to say about both ends of this coordination- the national 
ministries EU policy coordination practices and the role of Permanent Representation in 
formation of policy positions. Subsequently it is reasonable to examine how the level of 
delegation should affect the efficiency of the Presidency.  
The salience of the domestic inter-ministerial coordination factor has been stressed in 
some academic literature, although the research has not focused on it very extensively. 
Bunse has argued that the size of the Member State, which is conventionally regarded as 
the paramount factor, is not as relevant as inter-ministerial coordination for concluding 
dossiers.44 And even though efficient inter-ministerial coordination is not seen as the key 
element in success in the literature, it has been acknowledge that the lack of efficient 
coordination represents a major weakness for the Member States.45 The inter-ministerial 
coordination of EU policies is formally quite similar in most of the European Union 
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Member States. In many of the European Union Member States the Prime ministers’ roles 
and resources in EU affairs have grown significantly since the mid-1980s. Although the 
Foreign minister still play a central role, their dominance has eroded. Yet their central 
role is based on the fact that most often they act as coordinators of EU affairs, not least 
because the Permanent Representations in Brussels respond to them.46 
But of course there are a lot of dissimilarities on how the Member States conduct their 
EU policy coordination. The best overview about the differences gives the seminal book 
“The National Co-ordination of EU Policy-The Domestic Level” by Kassim et al.47 
Although slightly outdated, this still gives a great outline to analyse the coordination 
systems of Member States. One of the most salient conclusions of their comparison of ten 
different cases is that Member States have different coordination ambition- whereas some 
aim to construct an agreed position on every issue and to ensure coherent presentation by 
all national representatives at every stage of the EU policy process, others have more 
modest ambition that may be substantive- limited to particular policy types or issues- or 
procedural- ensuring that more important information is exchanged.48 Thus the 
coordinating mechanisms vary significantly in shape and goals- while some Member 
States (like France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark) use them to define their 
national positions, the others have more modest aims and ambition.49 And this level of 
ambition is also one of the key elements in understanding the dynamics and power 
relations between the capital and Permanent Representations in Brussels.  
The formal procedure of EU policy coordination, for example in developing the national 
positions on certain policy issues, can in simplified terms be described as follows. First 
the Commission’s proposal will be distributed to relevant experts. In most Member States 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or an EU coordination unit in the Government Office, 
attached to Prime Minister has a formal coordinating function.50 The domestic procedures 
prescribe whether and how lead ministries consult with other affected ministries. 
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Parliaments are formally involved to varying degrees, ranging from receiving mere ex-
post information to holding veto rights.51 In most the European Union’s Member States 
however the national executives tend to dominate their legislatures in EU affairs.52 In 
simplified terms this is how the domestic coordination of EU policies looks like.  
To understand the overall model of coordination between the capital and the Permanent 
Representation, it is also important to give an overview about how the Permanent 
Representations are involved in the overall EU policy coordination. The Permanent 
Representations have not gained much attention in academic literature, mainly only as 
part of looking at the bigger picture of EU policy coordination. And this is also reasonable 
as the Permanent Representation should not in essence be described as something too 
separate from the national ministries. This is especially so in the recent years as the 
modern technological capabilities ensure swift possibilities for communication whenever 
needed. Although the “distance” between capitals and Brussels has decreased due to that 
significantly, the relevance of dissimilarities between the two should nevertheless not be 
disregarded wholly. The two bodies still function in relatively different information 
spheres, as the Permanent Representation staff has the opportunity to acquire information 
often directly from the source, whereas the capital officials still have to rely mainly on 
information received through reporting. Additionally the socialisation factor apply, which 
have been proved by various studies.53 
To better examine the role of Permanent Representation in overall EU policy coordination 
it is reasonable for the sake of clarity to distinguish between two extremes of the level of 
delegation. On the one end there are the capital-based models, where the national 
ministries have the greatest ambition to control every stage of EU policy coordination, 
whether centrally or from specific ministry level. On the other end there are the so called 
Brussels-based systems, where most of the decision-making and position development 
has been delegated to the Permanent Representation in Brussels and national capital 
exercises only minor scrutiny over Permanent Representations actions.  
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Most of the studies have been descriptive case studies, focusing mainly on the functions 
of the Permanent Representations. But some emphasis has been put on other factors like 
the size of Permanent Representations and staffing policies. In their book “The National 
co-ordination of EU policy: The European level” by Kassim and Peters focused on four 
organizational aspects of the Permanent Representation: size, composition, personnel 
policy, and internal co-ordination.54 As noted by Panke there is considerable knowledge 
about the formal coordination procedures in EU Member States, but we have limited 
knowledge about the informal coordination practices for the working party and the 
COREPER level on which the vast majority of legislative acts are actually decided.55 
Thus even formally the role of Permanent Representation may not be so extensive, 
informally the Brussels representatives can be more involved than conventionally 
described.  
To examine the main research problem raised in this paper- how does the level of 
delegation affect the efficiency of the Presidency- we have to take a look at how this 
balance between the capital and Permanent Representation alters during the Presidency. 
The same continuum of Brussels-based vs capital-based applies.  
1.5 Link between the model of coordination and efficiency 
The central research question of this thesis- which role does the level of delegation play 
in determining the efficiency of the Presidency- is elaborated here. The level of delegation 
is reflected in how the inter-ministerial coordination is set up and what functions does the 
Permanent Representation have in this process during the Presidency. Each system of 
inter-ministerial coordination has its own merits and faults.56 As argued above the level 
of delegation can be visualised as a continuum. On the one extreme are countries that 
keep tight control in the capital. They tend to select people from ministries as chairpersons 
and tightly circumscribe the decision power of working group Chairs.  
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Main benefits of capital-based Presidency coordination model are as follows:  
- Minimises the concerns that officials based at the Permanent Representations might 
sacrifice national positions more easily (go native) due to personal relations- both 
with other attaches and officials from the EU institutions.57 Thus curtailing the 
possibilities that the negotiations will end up with a result that is unsuitable for the 
Member State holding the Presidency.  
- Building on the expertise in the capital, the Presidency has more “technical” 
knowledge on how feasible the negotiated compromises are when it comes to 
implementation of these provisions after the adoption of the negotiated legislation.  
- Allows the central body in capital responsible for EU coordination to exert more 
effective control over all policy fields. This will ensure that the Member State holding 
the Presidency has a coherent approach on all levels of policymaking.  
- The political level, meaning the ministers, are more engaged in the policymaking, 
providing the opportunity to utilise the leverage the ministers might have on the 
politicians from the other Member States to advance negotiations when necessary.  
Main benefits of Brussels-based coordination model: 
- Permanent Representations have expertise and negotiation skills gained in the pre-
negotiation phase of policy proposals and their familiarity with the other decision-
makers. The latter reduces the potential conflictual nature of the negotiations58 
- Decisions can be made significantly faster, making the whole negotiation process 
swifter.59 
- Permanent Representation officials acquire considerably more information about the 
concerns and view of other negotiating parties, inter alia through “confessionals”.60 
Comprehensive reporting system, to cover all aspects, may be cumbersome for the 
Permanent Representation, hampering the quality of its other tasks.  
- Many researchers have emphasised the strategic use of the Council Secretariat as a 
salient condition for successful Presidency.61 And it can be argued that the latter is 
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more probable with the Brussels-based Presidency model due to personal relations 
that exist between the attaches and Council secretariat’s officials.  
Taking into account the benefits and disadvantages of both models of coordination it 
could be argued that the best link between the capital and Brussels Permanent 
Representation could be characterized by a clear understanding between the personnel in 
Brussels and in the capital, so that at least the main principles and the “red lines” are clear, 
and consultation is necessary only before the most significant decisions are taken.62 Bunse 
has argued that in pursuing their objectives, Presidencies are best served by systems that 
rely heavily on their Permanent Representation without undermining or debilitating the 
overall control by the capital.63 Therefore a Brussels-based Presidency with not too 
cumbersome control mechanism by the capital should ensure highest efficiency of the 
Presidency in advancing the negotiations on priority dossier.  
Background variables 
In this section an overview about what have been considered salient factors in determining 
the success of the Presidency in the academic literature is given. This will provide the 
basis for assessment on whether the link between the level of delegation and efficiency 
of the Presidency is truly relevant or could the variation in efficiency also be explained 
by other factors.  
Issue-specific conditions for efficiency  
The institutional set-up of the European Union sets different limits on how the Presidency 
can achieve its goals. The academic literature has devoted effort into analysing how the 
institutional structure of the Council of the European Union affects the possibilities of the 
Presidency to deliver on its priorities. The studies by Elgström, Tallberg, and Wrantjen 
have all concluded that the method of voting plays a crucial role in determining the 
success rate of the Presidency to finalise its initiatives. The studies have shown that 
Presidencies have more influence and thus are more effective when the qualified majority 
voting (QMV) is applied, in contrast to unanimity voting. The QMV voting offers the 
Presidency as the chair of negotiations in the Council to have more leeway and flexibility 
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to ignore extreme positions by some Member States, which could hamper the possibilities 
to reach consensus. Although it is worth noting that the Council tends to seek if not 
unanimity then as much inclusiveness as possible also when QMV is applied, the so called 
norm of consensus mostly prevails.64 
Some of the research has focused on concrete policy issues, much like in this paper, and 
the analyses have stressed some elements that are issue-specific.  The issue-specific 
factors can for instance be the distribution of preferences between the parties as described 
by Vilpišauskas et al as well as intensity to protect those preferences. Many of the authors 
have concluded that the more extreme the Presidency’s preference is the higher level of 
influence the Presidency asserts on the other actors in Council and thus also on 
negotiation process. It has also been concluded that the less consensus among different 
actors (and institutions) exist the better the chances for the Presidency to shape the 
outcome of the negotiations according to its own preferences.65 But it is important to 
distinguish between the protection of the preferences of its own country during the 
Presidency and efficiency as defined in this thesis. The argument in this thesis is that the 
formation of Presidency’s priorities is to large extent not dependent only on its national 
interest. The process of priority formation is long and inclusive, engaging the interests of 
other EU institutions and taking into account the political reality. The aim of the 
Presidency is foremost not to advance policies that protect their national interests, but 
rather to promote and facilitate decision making process on legislative files that have been 
indicated as priority. But the Presidency cannot expect similar behaviour from other 
Member States to whom the norm of neutrality does not apply. It has been argued that the 
greater the intensity of Member States preferences, the less the likelihood that the 
Presidency can persuade them to change their views and that Member States will be 
particularly unlikely to compromise if they have vital national interest at stake.66 This 
means that the Presidency has to deploy other resources it has to avoid coalition-forming 
that could be counterproductive from Presidency’s compromise perspective. In the 
                                                
64 Bjurulf, Bo; Elgström, Ole (2004) “Negotiating Transparency: The Role of Institutions” Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol 42(2), p 257. 
65 Vilpišauskas et al 2013: 18. 
66 Bunse 2009: 59. 
27 
 
following section an overview will be given about the country specific factors that may 
have influence on how efficient the Presidency is.  
Country-specific variables  
The efficiency of the Presidency is of course foremost dependent on the Member State at 
helm. Although the list of variables presented here in non-exhaustive, it nevertheless 
gives a good overview about the main discussions in the field of Presidency’s efficiency.  
One of the most studied variable that is assumed to determine the level of performance of 
the Presidency is the size of the Member State. The conclusions on the relevance of the 
size factor are not straightforward, some claiming that small states are able to perform 
well in more managerial questions as they tend to rely more on other EU institutions.67 
The smaller states, with lower administrative capabilities are more willing to accept the 
help from European Commission and Council Secretariat. Both of these institutions, 
especially the first one, has to some extent its own agenda while offering assistance to the 
Presidency. Thus the larger Member States, which have the capabilities to act 
independently, tend to favour not delegating some of the duties to the aforementioned 
institutions. Other researchers have argued for the more obvious conclusion- larger 
Member States have more capabilities and resources to deploy and thus also larger 
potential a successful Presidency. In studying the overall functioning of the Council of 
the EU, and not particularly Presidency, Panke has argued that the interests of big states 
tend to be taken into account towards the end of negotiations, even if a minimal winning 
coalition could do without them.68 Thus we could conclude that other actors in the Council 
of the EU tend to avoid ignoring the arguments of larger Member States even if they are 
not needed for reaching the agreement. This could mainly be so because of the 
calculations that the support of this large Member State may not be so easy to ignore the 
next time and hence to keep good cooperation the other actors are willing to make 
concessions. But it could also be argued that during the Presidency the same logic applies 
and other actors are willing to make concessions to larger Member States holding the 
Presidency in order to maintain good cooperation also after the Presidency on issues that 
are of higher priority to the respective Member State willing to concede. One aspect of 
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the size factor that has received relatively little attention is the fact that during the 
negotiations on the new institutional setup of European Union after the Lisbon treaty, 
many of larger Member States favoured losing the rotating Presidency as a whole and 
opting for a more permanent solution. This was successfully challenged by smaller 
Member States, which saw this as an attempt to withdraw them from the most direct 
opportunity to affect EU decision making.69 One of the implications among other things 
could be the conclusion that larger Member States do not see so much additional leverage 
in fulfilling the role of the Presidency compared to its usual bargaining weight. Thus, in 
simplified way, it is also possible to reason that larger Member States are not as motivated 
at the helm of the Council compared to smaller Member States. But size can also play an 
important role from another perspective- the smaller states may be more efficient as 
Presidency, because they have less national interests that could hamper their willingness 
to proceed with negotiations. When the larger Member States have interests in almost all 
of the EU regulations, the smaller states may not be affected by them in such an extent 
and thus are hypothetically also more willing to find compromises and proceed with 
legislative dossiers that are on the table and are perhaps prioritised by other institutions, 
most notably by the European Commission. So the size as a factor can have diverse 
effects.  
Some authors have opted to analysing the political system of the Member State holding 
the Presidency. “While  existing research shows that the general ideological orientation 
of national governments is weakly, if at all, related to Member States’ policy positions at 
the EU level, this does not imply that national party politics is irrelevant to the distribution 
of  policy  positions  in  the  Council.“70 Many of the authors have stressed and also tried 
to analyse timely and adequate preparation as a factor of efficient Presidency. Although 
undeniably correct there is still lack of clarity on how exactly operationalise and measure 
the level of preparedness. Adequate preparation ensures that the Presidency is ready for 
expected or unexpected developments, that the procedures and informal rules are applied 
                                                
69 Nicolaidis, Kalypso; Bunse, Simone (2007) “The European Union presidency: a practical compromise” 
Open Democracy, available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the_european_union_presidency_a_practical_compromise 
(visited 15.05.2017).  
70 Thomson, Robert; Arregui, Javier; Leuffen, Dirk; Costello, Rory; Cross, James; Hertz, Robin; Jensen, 
Thomas (2012) „A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements (DEUII)“ Journal of European Public Policy, vol 19 (4), p 616. 
29 
 
routinely, and that dossiers can be identified where progress (or delay if so wished) are 
possible and also taking into account the political calendar or the EU and world politics, 
such as elections in key Member States, thus the external factors as described above.71 
The adequate preparation has for example been analysed by examining how clearly 
formulated the priorities of the Presidency are. This is complicated to operationalise, but 
nevertheless a salient variable as this also entails to what extent the Presidency has 
engaged the positions and agendas of the other institutions, European Commission and 
European Parliament, into its planning. As argued above in order to succeed with the 
legislative proposals, the Presidency needs good interinstitutional skills. In examining the 
adequate preparation factor some authors have concentrated also on the staffing policies 
and trainings.72 Thus there are several factors that have been examined to varying degrees 
in the academic literature so far. To keep the focus of the empirical study on a single 
negotiations process, these factors will not be directly incorporated into the assessment 
of the Italian and Latvian Presidency’s performance. However, it is relevant to 
acknowledge the relevance of these factors as well when conducting the comparative 
study on the level of delegation variable. 
Hypothesis formulation 
Building on the principal-agent framework presented above the main hypothesis of this 
paper is that the more Brussels-based the Presidency is, the more effective the Presidency 
is. The core underlying assumption for making this claim lies in the fact that the Brussels-
based Presidencies make far more informed decisions, as the decision-making powers are 
to large extent delegated to Brussels representatives, who have direct contacts to obtain 
this information and more experience about the decision-making in Brussels. 
Additionally, by delegating the duties, the decision-making time will be shortened and 
the cooperation between the Presidency and other EU institutions, most notably the 
Council Secretariat, will be improved. Last, but not least, the Brussels-based Presidencies 
do not have such a rigorous and possibly cumbersome reporting mechanism in place that 
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could mean a lot of workload in case of capital-based Presidencies for the Brussels 
representatives.  
Hence, the theoretical framework of this thesis, as presented in this chapter, gives a good 
basis for conducting a comparative empirical study on the performance of the Italian and 
Latvian Presidencies in advancing the negotiations on Telecom Single Market proposal. 
The Rational Choice Institutionalism provides the foundation for conceptualising 
efficiency of the Presidency as the advancement of negotiations on a priority issues, in 
contrast to pushing through national preferences like defined conventionally. But the 
principal-agent approach offers also excellent tools both to examine the model of 
coordination in both countries and also to analyse the linkage between the model of 
coordination and efficiency of the Presidency. In the following chapter a comparative 
analysis of the performance of the Italian and Latvian Presidency during the Telecom 
Single Market proposal negotiations is conducted.  
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2. Analysis of Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations 
In this chapter the findings of the conducted empirical study are presented and analysed. 
The performance of Italian and Latvian Presidency in the negotiations on the Telecom 
Single Market proposal is examined and compared. Firstly, an overview about the chose 
research method is given. This is followed by the elaboration on the Telecom Single 
Market proposal and its negotiations. Subsequently the performances of both the Italian 
and Latvian Presidencies is assessed. This is followed by the presentation of findings 
about the conditions for efficiency and how much can the efficiency be attributed to the 
chosen model of coordination.  
2.1 Research method 
The aim of this thesis is not to test the influence of all of the factors described in the 
theoretical part of the work, rather to examine the most understudied one- the level of 
delegation- in greater detail. As such the analysis does not seek to prove causality, but to 
qualitatively assess the impact of this factor on the effectiveness of the Presidency. One 
of the advantages of qualitative study, and the rationale of choice in this paper, is the fact 
that in enables better to assess the influence of other possible factors, also outlined in the 
theoretical framework, in the analysis. This means that although the main focus of the 
study is on the level of delegation factor, some emphasis will also be put on other 
variables to detect possible interlinkages that different variables may have. As such, the 
operationalisation of all of the factors must be conducted, although they are not examined 
in such a great detail as the level of delegation. The case selection is limited to two 
Presidencies to provide comprehensive analysis of both. The case selection offers the 
opportunity to compare the two and make conclusions about the relevance of the 
examined factors. The main source of information in this thesis are written documents, 
supported by semi-structured expert interviews. In this section I will elaborate in more 
detail how the empirical part of this study is composed, describing the analytical tools, 
operationalisation (including discussion on the validity, reliability and level of precision 
of chosen measurements), case selection, data collection process. 
Qualitative approach - MSSD  
Choosing from four fundamental scientific methods which can be used to test the validity 
of theoretical propositions- experimental method, statistical method, comparative method 
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and case study approach, the last two would probably be feasible and offer the best 
explanatory power in examining the efficiency of the Presidency.73 As the efficiency of 
the Presidency is dependent on so many factors and given the difficulties in both 
conceptualising and operationalising even the main variables, statistical large-n studies 
lack the level of precision needed to make comprehensive conclusions about the effects. 
As noted above, there has been several attempts to quantify the study of Presidency, but 
all of them more or less have not been able to assess the influence of other relevant factors. 
Measuring the factors quantitatively is difficult if not an impossible task as ultimately the 
efficiency of Presidency may depend on such informal elements like the personality of 
the Chair of the Working Party in the Council. Thus I would argue, opting for a qualitative 
approach is much more suitable. It may not be able to provide basis for conclusions on 
the causality, but it nevertheless offers the possibility to take a more meaningful sight on 
the different aspects of the Presidency’s performance. For example simply using the 
amount of legislation adopted during the Presidency as the measure of efficiency gives a 
one-sided picture, most evidently because of the fact that different Presidencies operate 
during different cycles of legislation process, which means that the amount of legislation 
is not so much dependent on the Presidency, rather the European Commission. It has even 
been claimed that up to 95% of the agenda of the Presidency is so to speak inherited.74 
Thus it is quite clear that conducting a large-n study, which would take so many elements 
into account is not easily feasible, it is more like comparing apples and oranges than a 
meaningful analysis in most of the cases.  
Opting for a qualitative approach offers many benefits, both in terms of validity, 
reliability and level of precision that can be applied. As the objective of this research is 
essentially to explore whether the level of delegation as a factor influencing the 
performance of Presidency is salient, the best method to assess this would be to compare 
two cases, both extremes of the delegation continuum. Thus applying the comparative 
method, with some caveats and particularities, is most suitable way to examine the impact 
of level on delegation on the efficiency of Presidency. Essentially the Mill’s Method of 
Differences is chosen, but with a looser application than the conventional concept, where 
                                                
73 Lijphart, Arend (1971) “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method” The American Political 
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74 Särekanno, Uku (2016) “3 müüti Eesti eesistumisest” Poliitika.guru portal, available at: 
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33 
 
only the dependent variable varies. The looser application means that the chosen cases 
share similar characteristics, but all of the independent control variables do not strictly 
match.75 So in simplified terms the two cases that will be compared - the two Presidencies 
- share many similarities, like being in the role of head of negotiations in the first place, 
but differences are in the dependent variable - the efficiency of the Presidency. Thus the 
comparison will enable us to examine which of the independent variables have more 
influence over the dependent variable. This brings us to the case selection, which provides 
the opportunity to elaborate more on the chosen method.  
Rationale behind case selection 
By exercising the comparison, it is possible to examine the role of different factors and 
eventually assess the correlation between the independent variables and dependent 
variable, in this case the efficiency of Presidency. Thus finding and selecting cases that 
have variation on the independent variable - level of delegation- is of utmost importance. 
But also other criteria for case selection applies. As the Lisbon Treaty brought crucial 
alterations to the role of the Presidency in the whole European Union institutional 
decision-making structure, it is essential that the Presidencies selected as cases took place 
after the adoption of the treaty. Of course the European Union itself has gone through 
rapid changes in the last years due to inter alia shifts in external and internal context, it 
would be reasonable to study the more recent cases to have more relevance and acuteness. 
Another criterion to take into account is that in order to truly compare cases it would be 
reasonable that the cases are fairly similar. So taking two Presidencies which terms are 
consecutive would also be advisable. Also the scope of the research has to be rather 
focused in order to provide detailed enough analysis and compare the cases. Thus 
focusing on the negotiations of a specific proposal rather than the whole Presidency or 
some formulation of Council has its merits. Although it has to be noted as well that this 
significantly lower the possibilities to make any conclusions about the Presidency as a 
whole. But focusing on the negotiations of the priority file of the Presidency gives rather 
good insights about how well the Presidency managed in its role. And from that we can 
also deduct the next criterion for case selection- both Presidencies must have prioritised 
                                                
75 Anckar, Carsten (2008) "On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most 
Different Systems Design in Comparative Research" International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, p 390. 
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the same initiative in order to compare. This is also related to the previously mentioned 
criterion that the Presidencies should be next to each other as the average process of 
negotiations is roughly one and a half years for 1st reading agreements, meaning three 
Presidencies.76 Hence, having two cases that meet with the criteria presented above will 
provide the opportunity to conduct substantial comparison between two separate 
Presidencies.  
The Italian and Latvian Presidencies in the field of Telecommunication policy qualify for 
the abovementioned criteria. First of all, both of the Presidencies put a lot of emphasis on 
the same proposal in their priority documents published prior to the start of the 
Presidency. Namely, both of the Presidencies indicated that they plan to advance 
negotiations on the Telecom Single Market legislative package. Both of the Presidencies 
are also post-Lisbon Treaty and successive- Italy was at the helm of the Council at the 
second half of 2014, Latvia took over in January 2015, ending its term in July 2015. The 
main criterion for case selection was that the two Presidencies have contrasting 
coordination system- one of the examples should be possible to be described as Brussels-
based Presidency and the other one as capital-based Presidency. And Italian and Latvian 
Presidencies meet also this criterion. Although there is a clear tendency of adopting 
Brussels-based Presidency models in recent years, especially in more technical policy 
areas, Italy is one of the outstanding cases that still opted for a more capital-based 
Presidency. Latvia in contrast devoted a lot on manpower to Brussels and their capital 
officials did not exercise excessive control over their Permanent Representation. Thus 
these two Presidencies have clearly a contrasting approach on the coordination and level 
of delegation, but this topic will be elaborated more closely in the following sections. 
Thus selecting these two cases offers an excellent opportunity to take a deeper look at the 
negotiations of one particular legislative proposal and this provides the opportunity to 
conduct substantial comparison.  
 
 
                                                
76 “European Parliament: Facts and Figures” (2017) Briefing by the European Parliamentary Research 
Service, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599256/EPRS_BRI(2017)599256_EN.pdf, p 
9.   
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Operationalisation of variables  
In the following section the set of indicators that are used to measure both the independent 
and dependent variables is presented. This is accompanied by the discussion on the 
validity and reliability of the chosen indicators.   
Dependent variable- efficiency of the Presidency 
The level of efficiency of the Presidency is measured in the amount of progress the 
Presidency made during the negotiations.  The sample of interviewees is small so the level 
of progress is mostly assessed based on the written documents, but the evaluations given 
by the interviewees are also taken into account. Alternative would have been to conduct 
a larger series of interviews to get a more comprehensive assessment on how different 
actors perceived the Presidency’s performance. However in this thesis, the selected cases 
are quite distinguishable in terms of achievements, thus the EU institutions’ written 
document analysis is sufficient and appropriate.  
The efficiency is defined through the priorities of the Presidency, which both the cases- 
Italian and Latvian Presidency- share.  
 Building on the theoretical framework provided above, efficiency is thus measured based 
on the following criteria:  
- Did the Presidency reach General Approach in the Council of the EU on Telecom 
Single Market negotiations?  
- Did the Presidency reach an agreement with the European Parliament on the Telecom 
Single Market proposal?  
- Additionally, the assessment by the interviewees about how much of the progress 
made can be attributed to the work of the Presidency is taken into account. 
As the number of cases in this qualitative study is only two, then the operationalisation 
of the dependent variable in greater detail and with larger set of criteria is not necessary. 
The chosen cases differentiate quite significantly on the achievements. The validity and 
reliability of the additional measurement- the contribution of the Presidency to the 
progress made- is more questionable. However relying on the assessments of the 
interviewees is the still the most valid and reliable source. The reliability is increased by 
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the fact that some of the interviewees are from the Council Secretariat, which, at least in 
theory, is a neutral actor.  
The main independent variable- level of delegation 
The level of delegation variable is operationalised similarly to the dependent variable. 
The measuring of how Brussels-based or capital-based the coordination model was is 
based on written document analysis and input received from the interviews. The main 
criteria of determining the character of the coordination model is described in the 
following table 1.  
Table 1.  
Independent variable  
 
Condition 
for efficiency 
Capital-based model Brussels-based model 
  
Indicators  
Priorities are developed mostly by 
the capital, the PermRep staff does 
not have relative autonomy vis-à-
vis the capital in formulating 
compromise proposals, the ratio of 
personnel actively engaged in 
negotiations favours capital, central 
operational role in capital. 
Priorities are developed jointly by the 
PermRep and the capital, the 
PermRep staff has relative 
autonomy vis-à-vis the capital in 
formulating compromise proposals, 
the ratio of personnel actively 
engaged in negotiations favours 
PermRep, central operational role in 
PermRep. 
Source: composed by the author, loosely based on Vandecasteele et al 2014. 
The main element of the indicator is the level of autonomy the Permanent Representation 
has. This is measured as follows:  
- How much is the capital involved in the priority setting?  
- How much is the capital involved in drafting the compromises? Who has the final 
say? 
- What is the ratio of people dealing actively with the Telecom Single Market 
negotiations in the capital and in the Permanent Representation?  
- Which body has the central operational role?  
Operationalising the level of delegation variable in such manner offers the necessary level 
of validity and reliability. Simply relying on the written documents, like rules of 
procedure of the Permanent Representation, would have been an alternative. However, 
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this kind of measuring would have had less validity as this does not take into account the 
informal rules and procedures that often apply, like was argued above as well.  
Data 
There is a clear lack of quantified data about the Presidency institution- for example about 
the influence the Presidency can exert on the negotiations. As already argued, compiling 
the data about Presidency in quantified form is anyway highly complicated and 
controversial because of the impossibility to capture and encompass many of the nuances 
related to the role of Presidency. Thus in this paper the qualitative assessment of 
Presidencies is used instead, which will give a more comprehensive picture about the 
influence the level of delegation has on the efficiency of the Presidency. This means that 
for this thesis two different types of data sources were chosen. First, written documents 
were compiled and reviewed. This includes both the official documents issued by the 
European Institutions and Presidencies themselves, but also external assessments 
conducted for example by think tanks concentrating on EU policies. Also some opinion 
papers by industry representatives are used, but with a critical discretion.  
As Larue has noted, the author has to be conscious that using only written documents as 
the source of information will provide primarily the formal picture.77 Thus, the other main 
source of information was the interviews conducted with both the officials from both the 
Italian and Latvian Presidencies, but also -for a more neutral perspective- with 
representatives of Council of the European Union. The interviews would give a more 
comprehensive picture about the informal nuances of European Union decision-making. 
However as the sample of interviewees is not too extensive as there are also certain limits 
to it, the interviews are used as a supporting source of information, mostly filling the 
deficits of written document analysis and providing a better feeling of which elements of 
the negotiations were of highest relevance. Altogether 4 expert semi-structured expert 
interviews were conducted. Among the interviewees were on official both from Italian 
and Latvian Permanent Representation, engaged directly with the Telecom Single Market 
negotiations. To increase the reliability and to acquire additional perspective, two 
interviews with General Secretariat of the Council were interviewed. The conducted 
interviews were semi-structured, providing the possibility to gain additional information 
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on the subject. All of the respondents were interviewed in April and May 2017. The 
Deputy Chair of the Telecom Working Party during Latvian Presidency (indicated as LV 
interview in the footnotes) and one Council Secretariat’s official (GSC 1 interview) were 
interviewed in person in Brussels 24th and 25th of April 2017.  The Italian Presidency’s 
Chair of the Telecom Working Party (IT interview) and the second Council Secretariat’s 
official (GSC 2) gave their responses in written form.  
Basing the analysis solely on interviews would be risky because of the following reasons. 
First, as already mentioned, the sample can inevitably be quite small as the number of 
people participating in policy formulation in one particular policy field is limited. 
Secondly, the researcher has to acknowledge the respondents’ reflexivity- the tendency 
of the interviewees to give answers she/he believes that the interviewer wants to hear.78 
This is of course accompanied by the bias that the respondents may have about their own 
performance and it also has to be kept in mind that some time has already passed, so the 
respondents are not able to recall all elements of negotiations in such extent as may be 
needed. And of course one has to be mindful that the interviewees have some limits on 
what they are willing to be transparent about, even if they are offered full confidentiality.  
2.2 Telecom Single Market proposal 
In order to analyse the performance of the Presidencies on this particular file, a 
comprehensive overview about the content and progress of negotiations so far is given. 
Having a deeper look into the content is salient as this also indicated the main rationales 
for Member States to hamper the progress on this proposal.  
The Commission adopted its proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market for 
electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent (the Telecom Single 
Market proposal) on 11 September 2013 with article 114TFEU as a legal basis.79 The 
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http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015923%202014%20INIT (visited 
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package was claimed by the European Commission to be the most ambitious plan in 26 
years of telecoms market reform, seeking to provide: 
- EU-wide and roaming-free mobile plans; 
- Simpler rules to help companies invest more and expand across borders; 
- First-ever EU-wide protection of net neutrality;  
- Abolishing premiums for international phone calls within Europe.80 
The legislative package was thus already published in the end of the previous European 
Commission mandate as it was launched by European Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso in his 2013 State of the Union speech, naming the package initially 
“Connected Continent”. Although it was Barroso who launched the legislative package, 
the main initiator was Vice President Neelie Kroes, the Digital Agenda Commissioner.81 
It could be also described as the final outcome of her long battle to fight roaming prices 
in European Union.  
The reactions to the presented legislative proposal were twofold. For European 
Parliament generally supported this initiative in most of its aspects. European Parliament 
managed to adopt its first reading position already on the 3th of April 2014.82 The most 
noteworthy amendment by the European Parliament was that they incorporated a 
definition of “net neutrality” as the principle to which all internet traffic is treated equally, 
without discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender, recipient, 
type, content, device, service of application. The later phases of the negotiations showed 
that this turned out to be one of the most politically loaded questions of the whole 
package.83 In terms of the content, the European Parliament’s proposal made significant 
amendments also on the roaming fees, setting the date for banning all roaming fees to 
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December 2015, and on the spectrum management, setting requirements for Member 
States to coordinate the bandwidth allocation.84 
All in all, this means that the European Parliament voted on its proposals for amendments 
before the end of their terms and European Parliament elections, which took place from 
22.-25.05.2014. On the one hand, this could be seen as a representation of parliament’s 
unity on the question. On the other hand, the more probable rationale to move faster with 
their amendments for the European Parliament was to put pressure on the Council of 
European Union. And the main reason for that was the critical reaction that the Member 
States presented when the Telecom Single Market proposal was launched. And this 
critical approach is also quite well observable from the fact that when for the European 
Parliament it took almost half a year to form a uniform position on every aspect of the 
package, the Council took a lot more time to negotiate their common take on the package.  
But not only the Member States were displeased with the Commission’s proposal put on 
the table by the European Commission, but also to large extent the industry. Initially the 
critique was based on the claim that the public consultation procedure, used for all the 
legislative proposals by the European Commission, was not exercised in the extent 
necessary as many of the stakeholders felt left out of the whole procedure.85 The Member 
States also pointed heavily on what they saw as a defective impact assessment, carried 
out by the European Commission.86 But the underlying element of critique by the Member 
States was obviously not the insufficiencies in the consultation procedure, rather it was 
the content. The Member States did not receive well the idea of greater harmonisation of 
national policies in telecoms. This was especially so with the Commission proposed 
coordinated spectrum assignment, which would have ultimately limited the Member 
States sovereignty in allocation the spectrum bandwidths in their respective telecom 
markets. Essentially this would have also meant that the Member States would have lost 
a relevant source of revenues. Thus the lack complaisance was quite apparent on 
coordinated spectrum management. But all in all the flagship proposal of the Telecom 
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Single Market package was of course the proposal aiming to abolish roaming surcharges. 
This has since then became one of the core elements of pro-European Union rhetoric used 
in European Commission’s external communication, because of its high visibility and the 
fact that the results are easily tangible to so many Europeans directly. Many Members of 
the European Parliament campaigned during the European Parliament elections in 2014 
on the pledge to end roaming and for them it has become an issue of institutional pride.87 
The course of negotiations in the Council  
Although the legislative package proposal was already published in September 2013 it 
did not see much progress during the Lithuanian Presidency. On the 5th of December 2013 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council held a policy debate on the new 
proposal. However, many of the Member States expressed their concerns about the 
process followed for the preparation of the proposal, the timeline envisaged for its 
adoption, the legal form of the act proposed and its substance. Some of the Member States 
even went so far to call into question the whole proposal.   
Regarding the substance: concerns have been expressed inter alia about: 
- the approach envisaged for the single EU authorisation given the uncertainty it entails 
regarding the powers of the regulatory authorities involved in different Member 
States, other important aspects for operators (e.g. consumer and tax legislation) which 
are not differing across Member States, and the limited interest expressed by operators 
for such provisions; 
- the consequences that several of the provisions could have on the investment 
climate (e.g. roaming, extensive harmonisation of end-users protection), stressing the 
need to strike an appropriate balance between consumers and operators; 
- the choice of approach for improved spectrum management, which should in any 
event preserve the value of spectrum and acknowledge national circumstances and 
competences and for which some would prefer the focus to be on common end dates 
for allocation rather than on a one-size-fits-all harmonisation process at EU level; 
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- the imposition of one specific means (European virtual broadband access products) to 
improve access to network; 
- the legal uncertainty that could result e.g. from provisions on roaming while Roaming 
III is about to be implemented as well as possible impact on domestic tariffs; 
- the net neutrality provisions where the envisaged extensive requirements on service 
quality might impair the further development of service providers, disproportionately 
affects small providers and relies on means (monitoring of speed access) affected by 
factors beyond the control of the providers; 
- disproportionate administrative burden, e.g. for regulators and operators involved in 
the single authorisation procedure; 
- smaller operators and markets as several provisions are seen as conducive to market 
consolidation and more beneficial to larger incumbents, which also puts into question 
the underlying approach of the proposal which instead of promoting efficient 
competition, as under the existing framework, seems to rely on market consolidation; 
- the shift of decision-making power to the Commission away from the national level, 
e.g. with respect to spectrum or market remedies, which appears unwarranted.88 
All in all, the fact that there was only a policy debate on the issues showed the lack of 
progress in the Council. And additionally that the policy debate indicated so many 
controversies for the Member States clearly showed that Member States do not have the 
incentive to move as fast as the European Parliament with the proposal negotiations. In 
simplified terms, the underlying element of all of the issues seems to be the last from the 
list provided above- avoiding losing national sovereignty to European Commission.   
The first tangible result from the Council’s negotiations came only under the Greek 
Presidency, when Council adopted a progress report on the state of negotiations so far.89 
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But naming this a result is also controversial as the adopted report essentially provided a 
critical assessment on the progress achieved so far.90 However the progress report also 
indicated areas where agreement may be easily reached. But based on the progress report, 
the main issues of confrontation between the Member States that had remained after 
several months of negotiations were the following:  
- Objective and scope: the main concern was the unclear link to and possible 
inconsistencies with the current telecom framework and its objectives as well as the 
risk of inconsistency between the two. 
- Single EU authorisation: They questioned its added value and feared that it would 
increase complexity, administrative burden and related costs.  
- Coordination of use of radio spectrum: several delegations found many of the new 
provisions too prescriptive and often overlapping or even conflicting with provisions 
of EU or national legislation. Most Member States consider that the provisions aimed 
at harmonising radio frequencies for broadband synchronisation delays and 
introducing a European mechanism for coordination of rights of use of radio 
frequencies go too far, in particular with regard to the proposed competences and the 
veto right of the Commission. 
- European virtual broadband access products: delegations found the provisions too 
detailed and unclear at the same time and stressed the need for a thorough market 
analysis before any such regulation is introduced. 
- Harmonised rights of end-users: on the consumer provisions Member States prefer 
minimum harmonisation to the proposed full-scale harmonisation, as this would allow 
them to keep or adopt more stringent national measures. 
- Open Internet (net neutrality): While delegations agreed that the right balance needs 
to be struck between net neutrality and reasonable traffic management, they had 
different views on how to achieve it. The common underlying principles relating to 
net neutrality were agreed on. 
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- The draft articles on roaming, which are to be found towards the end of the 
Commission proposal, have not yet been examined in detail.91 
It is definitely noteworthy that although the negotiations had been ongoing already under 
two Presidencies, there had not been any progress to be reported on the flagship initiative- 
roaming proposal. This in a way could have showed lack of political will by the 
Presidencies to deal with the issue or constructive assessment of political reality as many 
of the Member States saw the proposal in its initial form as highly controversial. Without 
examining the incentives and background of the two Presidencies in greater detail, it is 
possible to conclude that both Lithuanian and Greek Presidency did not make any 
significant advancements in negotiating the Telecom Single Market package. Content-
wise the discussion was still stuck on issues that the different actors were not able to 
compromise on. And it could also be argued that the completely contrasting proposal 
adopted by the European Parliament quite swiftly had its impact on the Council 
negotiations as well. Many of the Member States were reluctant to make concessions in 
a situation where they knew that additional concessions have to be made by the 
Presidency in case the interinstitutional negotiation phase with European Parliament is 
initiated. Thus having a strict and limited mandate for Presidency to use in discussions 
with the European Parliament was relevant for the Member States that were critical to the 
initial proposal by the European Commission, as the European Parliament’s approach 
went even further than that. In simplified terms it could be described even as a negotiation 
deadlock for all the diverging opinions on the matter and thus the Council was unable to 
form a common position. Hence it is possible to claim that little progress was made up 
until the start Italian Presidency.  
2.3  Examination of efficiency of the Presidency 
The aim of this study was to study the link between the level of delegation of efficiency 
of the Presidency. In the following section the findings of the qualitative study are 
presented. This chapter examines in greater detail the performance of Italian and Latvian 
Presidencies in leading the negotiations of Telecom Single Market proposal. This will 
                                                
91 2013/0309(COD)- 05/06/2014 Debate in Council (2014) European Parliament/Legislative 
Observatory, available 
at:/http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1350214&t=e&l=en.  
45 
 
start with a comprehensive examination of the course of negotiations under both 
Presidencies, which includes the assessment of the efficiency of both Presidencies. 
Subsequently, an overview about the context and priorities of the both Presidencies is 
given in order to examine the relevance of Telecom Single Market proposal for both 
Presidencies. This is followed by the presentation of results of the qualitative study on 
the main research question- what effect does the level of delegation have of the efficiency 
of the Presidency.  
2.3.1 Progress of negotiations under the Italian Presidency 
As examined above, Italian Presidency had in a way a fresh start for their negotiations on 
the Telecom Single Market proposal as well, because the previous two Presidencies- 
Lithuanian and Greek- have not made any substantial progress. Prior to the start of the 
Presidency the Italians indicated on several occasions that they are willing to go against 
tide in the Council and support the European Parliament-backed overhaul of EU telecoms 
rules.92 Next to the priorities, another good measure for Presidency’s incentives to 
advance negotiations is of course looking at how much time did the Presidency allocate 
for discussion in the working groups. Italian Presidency dedicated a significant amount 
of time for discussions on the working group level, devoting altogether over 10 working 
parties for this topic. High-level political input was sought by the Italian Presidency at 
the September informal ministerial meeting and a written consultation took place in July. 
The first tangible result from the discussions that started in July and went on in September 
was the new and substantially amended provisions presented by the Italian Presidency on 
19 September 2014. Compared to the initial Telecom Single Market proposal, the 
Presidency text introduced fundamentally different texts on roaming and spectrum, 
amended texts on open internet/net neutrality, and also addressed end-users rights. The 
following discussions on the Presidency’s amendments in a way already paved the way 
for future developments as many of the delegations indicated roaming and net neutrality 
to be the two core issues of the whole proposal. Eventually this resulted in an 
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understanding to focus continuing discussion only on the two core issues, primarily 
emphasising on roaming proposal, but also to some extent on net neutrality.93  
This line of thinking took a more formal shape in the draft proposal issued by the Italian 
Presidency on 21 November 2014, where the Presidency proposed:  
- a further revised text on roaming; 
- a text setting out an approach in principle to open internet/net neutrality.94 
Essentially this meant that the Italian Presidency wanted the telecoms ministers meeting- 
TTE Council- on 27 November 2014 to agree on a general approach, which would pave 
the way for negotiations with the European Parliament.95 However the Italian Presidency 
did not manage the TTE Council to agree upon a general approach.  
Thus the Italian Presidency failed a fulfilling the promise about ending the negotiations 
before the end of year. Although the Italian Presidency went as far as claiming to finalise 
and adopt the legislation as noted above, which would essentially mean an agreement also 
with the European Parliament, the Italian Presidency did not succeed in finding consensus 
among the Member States in the Council. Even narrowing the scope of the legislation and 
hence scrapping the overall level of ambition of the Telecom Single Market proposal by 
only concentrating on roaming and net neutrality provisions did not facilitate the process. 
Thus all in all, in comparison with the set priorities, the performance of the Italian 
Presidency in the role of leading the negotiations on Telecom Single Market proposal was 
not efficient as no significant progress was made.  
2.3.2 Progress of negotiations under Latvian Presidency 
Right after the official begin of their Presidency the Telecom teams of Latvian Presidency 
presented a roadmap on how to proceed with the negotiations on the Telecom Single 
Market proposal. This envisaged a new possible way for overcoming the difficulties in 
the Council negotiations, maintaining the approach chosen by the Italian Presidency- 
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concentrating only on the roaming and net neutrality parts of the ambitious Telecom 
Single Market proposal.96 The Latvians utilised the informal ministerial meeting, which 
took place on 21 January 2015, to get a common understanding and agreement on the 
content of this roadmap presented before. Content-wise the Latvian Presidency outlines 
a completely new approach to reducing mobile roaming surcharges (“roam like at home 
‘plus’”), which in general was approved by the ministers in the informal meeting, giving 
the leeway to move swiftly on with the negotiations on a more technical level- in the 
working parties.97 And the examination of the agendas of the working parties show that 
Latvian presidency had altogether 22 working party meetings on the Telecom Single 
Market. And on working party level it took the Latvian Presidency only 7 working party 
meetings to have a general approach adopted on 4 March 2015.98 This also gave the 
Latvian Presidency the mandate to start the negotiations with the European Parliament. 
However it must also be noted that although the Council had formed for a first time a 
common position after almost one and a half year of negotiations, the outcome was not 
so well received by other European Union institutions. For example the European 
Commission’s Vice-President for the Digital Single Market Andrus Ansip strongly 
criticised national government for trying to prevent the phasing out of mobile phone 
roaming charges from the end of 2015, calling the position adopted by the Council of 
Ministers “a joke”.99 Albeit the various criticism the Council managed to form an uniform 
decision and common understanding on how to proceed, paving the way trilogue 
negotiations with the European Parliament. And the negotiations with the European 
Parliament, which were deemed to be difficult, fulfilled the expectations. Nevertheless, 
the Latvian Presidency, 4 informal political trilogues supported by 15 technical trilogies 
and also 15 working party meetings in the Council of the European Union among the 
Member States themselves, Latvian Presidency managed to reach a political agreement 
with the European Parliament in the fourth and final 12-hour long trilogue, which finished 
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in the early hours of the very last day of the Latvian Presidency, 30 June 2015.100 But 
given the overall negative expectations and the fact that already at the first trilogue, that 
was held 23 March 2015 with the Member of European Parliament Pilar del Castillo 
representing the Parliament, the discussions were heated, the pace of progress was 
remarkable.101 With the agreement the Latvian Presidency persuaded both the Council 
and the European Parliament to compromise on a starting date of June 2017 for end of 
roaming surcharges- the Council had pushed for 2018 and the Parliament for 2016.102 
All in all the Latvian Presidency managed to reach a general approach in the Telecom 
Single Market negotiation with a few months and also was able to facilitate the progress 
in discussions with the European Parliament, reaching a compromise that could be seen 
as difficult for both sides- the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament. The Latvian Presidency thus managed to be efficient in its role as the lead of 
negotiations by making significant advancements on a legislative file that was indicated 
as a priority.  
In the following section the preconditions for the under-performance of Italian Presidency 
and the efficiency of Latvian Presidency in advancing the negotiations on the Telecom 
Single Market proposal will be analysed.  
2.4 Examination of the conditions for efficiency 
In this section the findings from the qualitative study- information acquired both from 
written documents and interviews- will be presented. This will be carried out in the form 
of comparison between the two cases- Italian and Latvian Presidencies. The comparison 
will enable to indicate more clearly the conditions that are most salient in determining 
whether the Presidency is efficient in its role as the mediator of the negotiations or not.  
So the aim of this section is to examine the main research problem- which factors have 
influence on the efficiency of the Presidency and to which extent this efficiency can be 
attributed to the benefits arising from Brussels-based Presidency. The examination is 
carried out if the form of comparison.  
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Table 2. 
  ITALY LATVIA 
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
Achievements Policy debate 
General approach, 
agreement with EP 
Pr
ec
on
di
tio
ns
 
Context Favourable Favourable 
Salience for the Presidency Priority Priority 
  Number of Working Parties 12 22 
M
ai
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e Model of coordination Capital-based Brussels-based 
  
Main operational centre 
Ministry of Economic 
Development COREPER 
Officials in Permanent 
Representation 1+1 3 
Officials in capital 4 NA 
Cooperation with GSC Very good Modest 
Source: composed by the author 
2.4.1 Preconditions 
Firstly the findings about two of the most overarching preconditions will be presented. 
These two conditions could be seen as underlying premises for Presidency’s performance 
as without the favourable context and salience to the Presidency it is unlikely that the 
Presidency would in the first place invest its time and political capital into advancing the 
negotiations. The similarity of these preconditions will provide the basis for the 
comparison.  
Context for Italian Presidency 
Italy took the role of Presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1st of July 2014, 
being the first of the new trio- consisting of Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg. It was also the 
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12th time in this role for Italy, making it one of the most experienced Member State in 
terms of Council Presidencies.103 
During the Council Presidency Italy had to manage some of the key events in the 
European institutional framework. For example:  
- the installation of the new Commission (the previous Commission’s mandate ended 
on 31 October); 
- the constitution of the new Parliament; 
- the reappointment of the President of the European Council (the polish Prime 
Minister, Donald Tusk had been chosen to succeed Herman von Rompuy);  
- and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
(Federica Mogherini succeeded Catherine Ashton).104 
Thus basically Italy as the Presidency had a fresh start with the legislative process. It 
could be argued that much like with the Greek Presidency, the hopes for Italian 
Presidency were not that high due to turbulent times, caused to large extent by the events 
listed above. Yet the Greek Presidency to some extent showed that even though the 
overall context may had been difficult for Presidency to follow through on its agenda and 
to be perceived as effective, the Greek Presidency managed to exceed the expectations in 
many policy fields.105 However it must be noted that some of the researchers do not share 
the same positive views about the Greek’s performance in the role of the Council’s 
Presidency.106 Without elaborating more on the outcomes of Greek Presidency, it is 
certainly clear that the prospect of having a successful image of its Presidency even in 
turbulent times is achievable. Nevertheless the overall context for Italian Presidency to 
succeed in advancing its priorities during its term could still be considered complicated. 
As noted by CEPS the turbulent times meant foremost that the “Commission was 
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repealing more than initiating legislation”.107 Although the European Parliament put 
much effort into clearing the table as much as possible before the elections, nevertheless 
there were some major legislative initiatives inherited from the previous mandate of the 
Commission that were not to be repealed. One of these was also the Telecom Single 
Market package.  
Also it could be argued that the domestic context was not very favourable for the Italians. 
Although Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi claimed high ambition for the Presidency 
and bold statements like urging Europe to “find its soul again” increased some of the 
expectations, the matter of fact was that transferring Renzi’s leadership style to the 
European context was deemed to be difficult.108 
Priorities of Italian Presidency 
The overall priorities of Italian Presidency were:  
- Employment and Economic Growth, with a particular focus on Small and Medium 
Enterprises (or SMEs) and sustainable development, to be linked to Expo Milano 
2015; 
- Protection of fundamental rights, with a special look to migration and asylum policies; 
- A more integrated foreign policy, focusing mostly on the Mediterranean and the 
Europe Neighbourhood policies including enlargement, and with an eye on the 
strategic partnership with Asian economies. 109 
But the Italian Presidency also indicated the Telecom Single Market package as one of 
its priority files. Italy’s undersecretary in charge of the dossier, Antonello Giacomelli 
stated: “Our priority is to find a solution within the end of this year” in his speech, 
promising that Italy will utilise its position as the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union to see the telecoms reform package finalised and approved.110 The Italian 
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Presidency even went as far as claiming that they are ready to support the European 
Parliament’s approach to large extent, despite widespread criticism of the plan by both 
the other governments and industry.111 According to one of the officials from the Italian 
Permanent Representation working on the telecom issues, inter alia Telecom Single 
Market, there was a “high political ambitions and vision”, which was however “not 
completely share by most of delegations at that stage”.112 
Thus it clear that in terms of setting the priorities, Italy made some bold statements and 
promised to advance the dossier as fast as possible.  
Context for Latvian Presidency 
In January 1st 2015 started Latvia’s first Council of the European Union Presidency. The 
broader international context was framed by the events in Ukraine and also gradual 
acceleration of the migrant crisis over the first half of 2015.113 Both of these influenced 
the priorities and workload of Latvian Presidency, however they could not be described 
as obstacles- as the focus on Ukraine was expected anyways- and all in all the broader 
international context was favourable for Latvian Presidency. 
From the European context point of view the Latvian Presidency faced comparable 
challenges to the ones Italian Presidency had to address. European Commission’s own 
policy priorities were still being formed, thus no major workload was to be expected. 
Especially so, because President of European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker has 
famously claimed that his Commission will be “big on big things and small on small 
things” and preparation of the “big things” took obviously more time and effort.114 So the 
Latvian Presidency had the incentive to move forward with the initiatives that had stayed 
on the table for quite some time. This also provided Latvian Presidency the opportunity 
to have more control over agenda-setting as otherwise the European Commission’s 
political pressure influences the priority-setting to larger extent. This meant that Latvian 
Presidency was able to put more emphasis on self-initiated policies as well.   
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On domestic front, the Latvia’s deep economic recession between 2008 and 2010 had its 
impact also on the discourse about the necessity and cost of holding the Presidency. 
Although even President Andris Berzins expressed his concerns about the costs and 
benefits of taking the role, this kind of criticism was relatively rare in government circles. 
And even though the parliamentary elections just months before the Presidency could 
have had serious implications, three broadly pro-European governing parties maintained 
a parliamentary majority, ensuring stability.115  
So in general the preconditions in terms of domestic, European and international context 
were to some extent similar to Italian Presidency, but a bit more favourable as the 
domestic situation was more stable and on the European institutional sphere there was 
certainly less confusion about the governance of the institutions as the leaders were all 
appointed by then.  
Priorities of Latvian Presidency 
The programme of priorities of the Latvian Presidency were not a big surprise as the 
Presidency did its best to accommodate the European Commission political will.116  
The three main priorities of Latvian Presidency were:  
- Competitive Europe- with the main goal to generate jobs and economic growth; 
- Digital Europe- to develop the base for a truly digital Europe; 
- Engaged Europe- engage in issues of global importance.117 
Putting so much emphasis on digital agenda by making it one of the three main elements 
of the programme was of course noteworthy. However the Digital Europe did not only 
include Telecom Single Market proposal. Latvians Presidency also put a lot of emphasis 
on negotiations on the data protection framework and cybersecurity. But nevertheless 
succeeding with the negotiations on Telecom Single Market was high on the agenda for 
the Latvian Presidency. In its “Work programme of the incoming Presidency” the Latvian 
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Presidency states ambitiously the following: “In view of making further progress in 
strengthening the Digital Single Market and in evolving the legal framework, the Latvian 
Presidency will, depending on the state of play and respecting the interests of different 
stakeholders, give due consideration to the proposal for a Regulation laying down 
measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to 
achieve a Connected Continent (TSM)“.118 Hence, it is clear that Latvian Presidency saw 
the advancement of Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations as one of the key 
priorities during their Presidency. In the following section an overview about the course 
of negotiations in the Council of the European Union is given.  
All in all it is clear that although the overall context of both Presidencies could not be 
seen as very favourable, the Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations were not 
highly influenced by that. And this was also shown by the analysis of the priorities of 
both Presidencies, proving that both Presidencies made significant promises to advance 
the negotiations on the Telecom Single Market proposal. Given that these preconditions 
can be seen as fairly similar for both Presidencies, the next section focuses on presenting 
the findings about the main independent variable.  
2.4.2 Level of delegation of Italian and Latvian Presidencies 
The comparison between the Italian and Latvian Presidency clearly shows that whereas 
Italy applied the capital-based coordination model, the Latvian Presidency opted for a 
Brussels-based approach. The research indicated substantial differences in many aspects 
of the model of coordination of these Presidencies.  
Italian model of coordination 
In the case of Italian Presidency the operational/decisional role was carried out by the 
Ministry of Economic Development-Communications in Rome. This means that the main 
actor in setting both the priorities, national positions and working out the possible 
compromises was the competent Ministry.119 This to some extent shows that informal 
practices are applied in the coordination of EU policies as the standard procedure sees 
that the relations between Italian Government and the EU institutions are ensured by the 
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Prime Minister through a State Secretary, whose action is supported by the Department 
for European Policies.120 The findings indicate that the interaction between the capital 
and Permanent Representation was direct.  
The Working Party Chairperson was responsible for the communication between the 
Ministry and Permanent Representation. It was stated that: “every decision taken in Rome 
was forwarded to me in order to share it with the Deputy Permanent Representative and 
his team”. And the capital was also involved in the drafting sessions, which take place to 
form compromises that are presented in the Working Parties to the other Member States. 
The capital officials were actively involved in these sessions, whether through being 
present or giving out strict instructions, especially for giving out “political directions”.121 
The Working Party Chairperson was said not to have enjoyed the same freedom as the 
Latvian Working Party Chair in the Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations.122 
Also the ratio between the officials dealing with the Telecom Single Market proposal in 
Brussels Permanent Representation and capital favoured the latter- the team in Rome 
consisted of 4 persons, whereas in Brussels the Chairperson of the Working Party was 
accompanied by one “junior” official. The monitoring process between the capital and 
Permanent Representation was described as “extensive”, conducted mostly through 
exchange of mails and phone calls.123 This extensiveness was described “exaggeratingly” 
by an official from the Latvian Presidency as the obligation for the Italian Presidency and 
the Chair of the Working Party to “report every single comma to the capital”124 
The Italian Presidency considered the cooperation with General Secretariat of the Council 
to be very good, defining it as the real metronome of the day-by-day work. Also extensive 
experience and knowledge of the processes was named as the advantage of the General 
Secretariat of the Council. Italian Presidency assessed the cooperation with the European 
Commission to be very good “under the technical point of view”, but it was also brought 
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out that the European Commission was “sometimes a bit pressing in terms of timing and 
delivering”.125 
Latvian model of coordination  
In general, in the Latvian model of coordination the central operational role was given to 
Permanent Representation. The argumentation for the choice of Brussels-based and more 
specifically COREPER-centric Presidency was that the latter provides horizontal 
overview about all the policy issues. This meant that also the agendas for the Council of 
Ministers meetings were prepared and set on that level.126 The Latvian Presidency was 
Brussels-based and the decisions were made mostly by the small team in Brussels.127And 
on the telecom issues the team enjoyed “very big freedom” from the capital in making 
operational decisions. An official from the Latvian Permanent Representation working 
directly on the Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations claimed that he “cannot 
recall a single occasion where capital would have disagreed with the decisions made by 
the Brussels telecom team”.128 Yet the overall coordination model acknowledged the 
necessity to keep the political responsibility in the capital.129 In the Telecom Single 
Market negotiations this was best reflected in the informal meeting of ministers in the 
beginning of the Presidency. This enabled the Latvian Presidency to employ political 
resources- their minister- to exert leverage on the other ministers. The informal meeting 
was said to have “kicked other Member States’ apparatuses to be more flexible” in the 
Telecom Single Market negotiations throughout the Presidency.130 
In general the Latvian Presidency aimed at ensuring pragmatic division of labour and 
empowering the Permanent Representation without shifting the political responsibility 
wholly from capital to Permanent Representation. Reinforcing the Permanent 
Representation meant also in terms of manpower, but at the same time avoiding a “brain-
drain” from the capital.131 The similar arrangements were also made in the coordination 
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model applied on Telecom Single Market negotiations. Due to Presidency the 
conventional organisational build-up of the Permanent Representation was restructured 
by creating a new unit. The head of unit was accompanied from the telecom side by three 
other officials.132  
The line of communication between the Permanent Representation and the respective 
ministry was direct, meaning that the central coordinative body did not meddle 
excessively. This referred to both the national position formation and priority setting for 
the Presidency. The reporting was done by the Permanent Representation on regular basis, 
just to keep the capital “aware” of the decisions and progress made. The reporting was 
more a formality and was considered to some extent burdensome, but nevertheless 
necessary.133  
The cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council was considered poor both by 
the Latvian Presidency representatives and Council Secretariat officials.134 While the 
Latvian Presidency side stressed mostly the problem with official working hours of the 
Council Secretariat, the latter pointed out the relevance of personalities to match for 
having a meaningful cooperation.135 
Thus the research has clearly demonstrated that the models of coordination that these two 
Presidencies adopted were detrimentally different. In the following section an analysis is 
provided on how these respective models may have had affected the performances of 
these two Presidencies. Essentially, can the under-performance of Italian Presidency and 
the efficiency of Latvian Presidency be attributed to the chosen models of coordination?  
2.5 The link between level of delegation and efficiency of the Presidency 
In this section the findings about the main hypothesis of this paper will be presented. 
According to the main hypothesis the more Brussels-based the coordination model of the 
Presidency is, the more efficient the Presidency is in mediating the negotiations. This 
hypothesis is accompanied by three underlying premises that eventually should be 
translated to the success of negotiations:  
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- The Brussels-based Presidencies are able to make more informed decisions as the 
officials have direct contacts to other decision-makers and more experiences about 
decision-making in Brussels; 
- This model of coordination increases the possibilities that the officials have better 
cooperation with other EU institutions, most notably with the Council Secretariat and 
European Commission; 
- The Brussels-based Presidencies have a less cumbersome monitoring system in place 
for the policymakers, ensuring more resources for advancing negotiations.  
In this section the findings about the relevance of these premises in determining the 
efficiency of the Presidency are presented.  
There was a wide consensus among the interviewees that the one of the key elements in 
Latvian Presidency’s good performance with the Telecom Single Market proposal 
negotiations was the fact that they opted for a Brussels-based Presidency. The main 
benefit of this kind of model of coordination was considered to be the speed.136 In the 
words of one Council Secretariat official, who was engaged with the Latvian telecom 
team confirmed that during Latvian Presidency the decisions were made mostly by the 
small team in Brussels, but at the same time the Presidency was “mindful of the Latvian 
situation in its approach to the issues”.137  
The main reasons why the Brussels-based models were considered more efficient were 
the following. It was indicated that the Brussels-based Presidencies understand the 
process better and on operational level, they are able to make quick decisions on spot.138 
The findings also demonstrated that Brussels representatives are more familiar with the 
people involved and have more understanding of individual concerns and flexibilities.139 
In addition, it was mentioned that Brussels-based Presidencies are better able to build 
trusting relations with all the actors of the negotiations.140 One of the Council Secretariat’s 
official claimed that Brussels-based Presidency helps to avoid situation which can occur 
if the capital is more involved, for example also in the drafting sessions, where the 
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participating experts from the capital lack the political feel and might be pushing for 
something that is in technical terms correct, but will never go through because of political 
pressures.141 Also, Brussels-based Presidencies are more likely to act as “honest brokers” 
in mediating the negotiations. The Latvian Presidency even claimed to go as far as not 
having the outcome that they wanted by stating: “obviously what we got in the end was 
not what we wanted”. That contradiction to its own national preferences was also 
reflected in the fact that the achieved compromise was not in accordance with the Latvian 
national position agreed upon already in the start of the Telecom Single Market proposal 
negotiation prior to the start of Latvian Presidency.142 Brussels-based Presidency 
provided the Latvian Presidency better chances to constantly check with other Member 
States whether their considered compromise is suitable without having to wait for the 
Working Party to take place- “the real deals are not made in Working Parties, but in 
bilateral meetings”.143 And last but not least, the reporting duty is not so cumbersome, 
leaving more resources for other activities.144 
The overall assessment was the premise that Brussels-based Presidencies are “more 
effective in bringing the negotiations forward”.145 But the responses also indicate clearly 
that the model of coordination’s effect is dependent on the legislative file the negotiations 
are held on and should not be seen as the only relevant factor.146 The officials from the 
Council Secretariat stressed on various occasions the relevance of personalities of the 
Presidency’s officials as a factor that has strong influence on how efficient the 
negotiations will be.  
2.6 Discussion on the findings  
The findings demonstrate quite clearly that Latvian Presidency was more efficient in its 
role as the mediator of the negotiations on the Telecom Single Market proposal. The 
comparison of achievement clearly favours Latvian Presidency over Italian Presidency. 
And the findings also indicate the main reasons behind this.  
                                                
141 GSC 1 interview. 
142 LV interview. 
143 LV interview. 
144 LV interview.  
145 GSC 2 interview. 
146 LV interview, GSC 1 interview.  
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The comparison between Italian and Latvian Presidencies shows quite significant 
differences in terms of model of coordination as well. Whereas the Italian Presidency 
clearly opted for the capital-based model, the Latvian adopted a Brussels-based model. 
The choice of Italians is nevertheless interesting as many of the Presidencies, especially 
in such a technical field as the telecom issues, tend to adopt the Brussels-based 
coordination model. The findings clearly indicate that in the case of Telecom Single 
Market negotiations most of the premises presented in the theoretical part of this thesis 
are correct. The written document analysis and interviews show clearly that in the 
Brussels-based model, the representatives can utilise several advantages compared to the 
capital-based model. The findings confirm that enjoying more leeway in decision-making 
provides the Permanent Representation opportunity to make decision much faster. Also 
the expertise factor was clearly demonstrated in the findings- the Brussels representatives 
have a much better understanding of the political reality among Member States and other 
EU institutions, helping to avoid being stuck on technical details that may hamper the 
overall progress. However the results show that being informed about the technical 
aspects was also considered relevant- whether achieving it through extensive cooperation 
with the European Commission or effective communication with the capital experts.  
In terms of efficiency, as defined in this paper, the Brussels-based Presidencies tend to be 
also more suitable, as the team in Brussels is able to distance themselves from the national 
positions and preferences more easily. The Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations 
showed remarkably well how Latvia was willing to go beyond its national position to 
reach a compromise. This corresponds well with the rational choice institutionalist 
theoretical framework of this thesis, claiming that due to institutional constraints the 
Member State holding the Presidency has more to gain in terms of reputation from being 
an “honest broker” and “ticking” as many legislative proposals off the table as possible. 
The Telecom Single Market negotiations thus indicate quite clearly that Latvia’s 
incentive was being perceived as “honest broker” by other actors and achieve as much 
progress as possible, not advancing or protecting the national interests of its country per 
se. This of course does not mean that this implication could be generalised and utilised to 
explain all EU policy fields as there are major differences on how the Member States see 
for example foreign policy and single market development.   
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The findings demonstrate that the most efficient measure to tackle possible information 
asymmetry that may occur between the principal and agent is the Permanent 
Representation’s reporting duty. The direct monitoring of agent’s actions for example 
through extensive involvement of capital experts in the drafting sessions can lead to other 
problems like argued above. The reporting task should thus be extensive enough to keep 
the capital aware of the progress and possible major problems, but not so extensive that 
it would be administratively too burdensome for the Permanent Representation. But 
keeping the capital informed can all in all be regarded as a salient factor in determining 
the success of negotiations. The main argument for this statement is that oftentimes the 
Member States, especially the larger ones, tend to prefer direct communication with the 
capital in case of problematic issues to put political leverage on the Presidency. So it is 
important that the capital will not promise some other Member State something that could 
hinder the performance of the Presidency in Brussels negotiations. Therefore both the 
agent and principal are interested in well-functioning and optimal reporting mechanism. 
Not only can the agent prevent the principal’s misjudged decisions, but also more 
effectively utilise the political level for its own cause. The example here is the informal 
Ministerial meeting that set the tone for the whole term.  However in the case of Telecom 
Single Market negotiations the Brussels-based Latvian Presidency claimed not to have 
used this measure of utilising the ministerial level to advance discussions.  
One of the key premises was also that the Brussels-based Presidencies are more effective 
in advancing the negotiation due to better cooperation with General Secretariat of the 
Council. However this study, focusing on one particular negotiation, does not support this 
assumption. Whereas during the Italian Presidency the cooperation with Council 
Secretariat was considered good, the Latvian Presidency referred to several problems and 
the cooperation was considered modest by both the Latvian Presidency and Council 
Secretariat. Therefore, the analysis of these two cases show that although Brussels-based 
Presidency model may increase the probability of good cooperation between the 
Presidency’s team and Council Secretariat, this was not so in Latvian case and thus this 
link cannot be considered relevant.  
As for the background variables presented in the theoretical part of the study, the findings 
offer limited information. However, it is relevant to discuss, whether it is possible that 
the variation in efficiency of the Italian and Latvian Presidencies in advancing the 
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Telecom Single Market negotiations may be better explained by some other variables. 
The most obvious possible independent factor that might have influence on the 
performance of the Presidency is of course the most studied variable- the size. In this case 
this would mean that the smaller Member State was more efficient in leading the 
negotiations than the larger one. This corresponds quite well with the premise presented 
also in this paper that smaller states are more likely to act as “honest brokers” as they tend 
to have less fixed preferences on concrete issue due to the fact that they are not affected 
by it. However the outcomes of the Telecom Single Market dossier are extensive for both 
Member States studied here and as such both of these Member States had strong 
preferences on the final outcome. As seen from the findings, Latvian Presidency was able 
to move past its own preferences to reach a compromise with other Member States. But I 
would argue that this flexibility could more be attributed to the adopted model of 
coordination than the size factor. The former provides more explanatory power with 
greater level of detail. But as for the issue-specific variables that could determine the 
efficiency of the Presidency, the results of this study indicate that there were no major 
differences during Italian and Latvian Presidency. It could argued that this possibility was 
minimised with the case selection as choosing Presidencies so close to each other and 
focusing on one particular dossier will ensure the similarity of issue-specific variables 
like the model of voting or distribution of preferences of different actors in the Council. 
Also in the quality of the preparations for the Presidency any major variation could not 
be detected. As the examination of preconditions showed, both Presidencies had 
formulated clear and ambitious priorities for their Presidencies in the field of telecom. 
This thesis did not focus however on the quality of training of the officials engaged in 
negotiations from the Presidencies. This could be a significant factor. However it must be 
noted that the Italian Presidency’s telecom team, which turned out to be more inefficient 
in leading the negotiations, was very experienced. This of course does not mean that this 
factor should not be further studied. But all in all, the comparison of Italian and Latvian 
Presidencies in the Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations shows that all other 
possible factors seem not to have such an extensive variation or relevance as the model 
of coordination variable.   
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Conclusions 
The chosen model of coordination affects the performance of the presiding country in its 
role as the mediator of the negotiations. The empirical comparative study of Italian and 
Latvian Presidencies’ performance in mediating the negotiations on Telecom Single 
Market proposal in general confirms the main hypothesis of this thesis. Namely, that the 
link between the chosen model of coordination and efficiency of the Presidency is salient. 
The aim of this study was to examine in greater detail how much of the Presidency’s 
efficiency can be ascribed to the level of delegation variable. 
The theoretical framework presented in the first chapter of this study introduced the 
rational choice institutionalism as the underlying foundation for analysing the 
performance of the Presidency. This theoretical approach provided the necessary 
analytical tools for conceptualising efficiency of the Presidency as advancement of 
negotiations on a priority. This is in contrast with the conventional approach, which sees 
the success of the Presidency in promoting the national interests. Thus rational choice 
institutionalism provides the possibility to take also institutions, inter alia the norm of 
neutrality, into account when analysing the incentives of the Presidency. The bottom line 
is that institutions matter and shape the conduct of the Presidency. Hence the Presidency 
can be conceptualised as efficient in case it is able to make progress in negotiations in the 
Council of the European Union on a priority initiative. Rational choice institutionalism 
also provided the analytical tools to take informal aspects of decision-making into account 
when assessing the adopted model of coordination of the studied Presidencies. The use 
of principal-agent approach helped to examine the model of coordination in both the 
Italian and Latvian Presidencies and also to form the main hypothesis of this paper. The 
hypothesis that the more Brussels-based the Presidencies are, the more efficient they are 
was accompanied by several additional premises that should have helped to explain the 
link between the level of delegation and efficiency of the Presidency.  
The second part of this thesis utilised the presented theoretical framework to conduct a 
comparative study on the performance of the Italian and Latvian Presidencies in the 
Telecom Single Market proposal negotiations. The analysis was based on the data 
acquired both through examination of written documents, but also interviews were 
conducted to get additional insights about the informal functioning of the model of 
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coordination. The operationalisation of model of coordination variable put most emphasis 
on how much leeway from the capital does the Permanent Representation have in 
meditating the negotiations. The findings of the comparison between Italian and Latvian 
performance demonstrates quite clearly that Latvian Presidency was much more efficient 
in advancing the negotiations on the Telecom Single Market proposal, which was a 
priority for both Presidencies. Although Italy aimed to make swift progress, they were 
only able to have policy debate on Council level, instead of reaching an agreement. 
Latvian Presidency on the other hand was able to conclude the negotiations both within 
the Council and with the European Parliament.  
 The findings from the comparative study indicate that there were also significant 
differences in the adopted models of coordination. Whereas Italy chose the capital-based 
model, Latvian Presidency opted for a Brussels-based approach. In Italian case the capital 
was actively engaged in all phases of the negotiation mediation, making the process 
slower and more cumbersome for the Permanent Representation as everything had to be 
reported and coordinated before a decision could be made. The Latvian Presidency in 
contrast enjoyed extensive freedom, making it possible to draft new compromises and 
consult with other actors in much faster pace. Nevertheless, one of the key theoretical 
premises of why Brussels-based Presidencies should be more successful, was not 
confirmed. Namely, the good cooperation with the Council Secretariat that should be 
derived from the fact that the officials can build much better mutual trust was not backed 
by the findings. Whereas Italian Presidency had good cooperation with Council 
Secretariat, the Latvian Presidency’s cooperation was not as good. All in all the empirical 
study conducted in this thesis clearly demonstrates that the key assumption related to the 
more efficient nature of Brussels-based Presidencies is confirmed in Telecom Single 
Market proposal negotiations.  
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DELEGEERIMISE ULATUS JA EFEKTIIVSUS: TELEKOMI ÜHTSE TURU 
EELNÕU LÄBIRÄÄKIMISTE VÕRDLUS ITAALIA JA LÄTI EUROOPA LIIDU 
NÕUKOGU EESISTUMISTE NÄITEL 
Klaus-Erik Pilar 
Resümee 
Antud magistritöö eesmärgiks on uurida täpsemalt põhjuseid, miks osad liikmesriigid on 
Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu eesistuja funktsioonis edukamad kui teised. Töö peamine fookus 
on seni väheuuritud muutuja- delegeerimise ulatuse- ja eesistumise efektiivsuse vahelise 
suhte analüüsimine. Nimelt on töö peamiseks hüpoteesiks, et Brüsseli-põhise 
koordinatsioonimudeliga eesistujad on edukamad kui need eesistuvad liikmesriigid, kus 
peamine koordineeriv roll jääb pealinna kanda. Ratsionaalse valiku institutsionalismi 
teoreetiline raamistik pakub mitmekülgse lähenemise selle teema analüüsimiseks. 
Üheltpoolt võimaldab see eesistuja efektiivsust defineerida kui tema võimet edendada 
läbirääkimisi eesistuja jaoks prioriteetse algatuse osas. Kui konventsionaalselt peetakse 
eesistuja efektiivsuseks või eduks võimekust enda rahvuslike huvisid edendada, siis 
ratsionaalse valiku institutsionalism võtab arvesse ka institutsioonide, muuhulgas 
normide nagu neutraalsuse normi, olulisust. Lisaks võimaldab see teoreetiline lähenemine 
analüüsida täpsemalt eri riikide Euroopa Liidu poliitikate koordinatsioonimudeleid. 
Printsipaali-agendi mudeli rakendamine võimaldab püstitada töö peamise hüpoteesi- 
mida rohkem otsustusõigust on delegeeritud Brüsselis olevatele esindajatele, seda 
efektiivsem on eesistuja omale prioriteetse algatuse läbirääkimiste edendamises.  
Magistritöö empiirilises osas võrreldakse Itaalia ja Läti eesistumise kogemust Telekomi 
Ühtse Turu ettepaneku läbirääkimiste edendamisel. Kirjalike materjalide analüüsile ja 
intervjuudest saadud lisainformatsioonile tuginev võrdlus näitab, et Läti oli antud eelnõu 
läbirääkimiste edasiviimisel oluliselt efektiivsem kui Itaalia eesistujana. Ometi olid nii-
öelda eeltingimused ehk eesistumise kontekst ja eelnõu prioriteetsus eesistuja jaoks 
mõlema eesistuja puhul sarnased. Itaalia ja Läti eesistumise koordinatsioonimudelite 
analüüs näitab, et kui Läti otsustas Brüsseli-põhise mudeli kasuks, siis Itaalia 
koordinatsioonimudel nägi ette pealinna tugevat sekkumist läbirääkimiste juhtimisse. 
Empiiriline analüüs tõestab, et Läti eesistumise valitud mudel võimaldas teha otsuseid 
kohapeal ja seetõttu kiiremini. Samuti võimaldas rakendatud koordinatsioonimeetod 
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läbirääkimistel lähtuda poliitilisest reaalsusest ning vähem rõhku panna tehnilistele 
küsimustele, mis sageli võib juhtuda pealinna-kesksete mudelite puhul. Lisaks sellele 
andis Brüsseli-põhine lähenemine parema aluse koostööks teiste osapooltega. Samas 
tuleb tõdeda, et vähemalt üks eeldusi, miks Brüsseli-põhine mudel peaks olema 
efektiivsem ei pidanud paika. Nimelt ei olnud Läti eesistumise efektiivsuse põhjuseks hea 
koostöö Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu Sekretariaadiga nagu teoreetilise osa põhjal oleks 
võinud aimata. Seda koostööd hindasid heaks hoopis itaallased, kuid kelle efektiivsus 
antud eelnõu läbirääkimiste edendamisel oli oluliselt madalam. Seega kokkuvõttes võib 
väita, et antud töös esitatud hüpotees, et Brüsseli-põhine koordinatsioonimudel 
võimaldab efektiivsemalt läbirääkimisi eesistuja jaoks prioriteetses eelnõus edasi viia 
vastab antud näidete puhul tõele.  
  
73 
 
Mina 
Klaus-Erik Pilar 
(autori nimi) 
(isikukood: 39010220225) 
annan Tartu Ülikoolile tasuta loa (lihtlitsentsi) enda loodud teose 
 
Delegation and Efficiency: Comparison of Telecom Single Market Negotiations 
under the Italian and Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU, 
 (lõputöö pealkiri) 
mille juhendaja on  
Piret Ehin, 
(juhendaja nimi) 
 
  
1. reprodutseerimiseks säilitamise ja üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemise eesmärgil, 
sealhulgas digitaalarhiivi DSpace-is lisamise eesmärgil kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse 
tähtaja lõppemiseni; 
 
2. üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks ülikooli veebikeskkonna kaudu, sealhulgas 
digitaalarhiivi DSpace´i kaudu kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse tähtaja lõppemiseni; 
 
3. olen teadlik, et punktis 1 nimetatud õigused jäävad alles ka autorile; 
 
4. kinnitan, et lihtlitsentsi andmisega ei rikuta teiste isikute intellektuaalomandi ega 
isikuandmete kaitse seadusest tulenevaid õigusi. 
 
 
Tartus, 22.05.2017 (kuupäev) 
______________________________________ 
(allkiri) 
 
